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Jose Felipe Anderson* 
-Men regard it as their right to return evil for evil-and, if they cannot, feel 
they have lost their liberty. 
Aristotle 
Nicomachean Ethics (4th C.B.C.) 
- To return violence for violence does nothing but intensify the existence of 
violence and evil in the universe. Someone must have sense enough to cut 
off the chains of violence and hate. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
"Advice for Living" (1958) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Payne v. Tennessee, I 
upholding the use of victim impact statements2 in capital jury sentencing 
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proceedings, marked one of the most dramatic reversals of a precedent in the 
history of United States constitutional jurisprudence. The decision in Payne 
expressly overruled Booth v. Maryland3 decided only four years earlier. The 
Booth case rejected the use of victim impact statements in capital sentencing 
cases that involved juries. In Payne, the Supreme Court made it clear that 
victims were entitled to offer, and juries were permitted to consider, the 
effect that a "death eligible" homicide had on surviving relatives, even if the 
defendant was unaware of the impact he would cause at the time of the 
crime.4 
The understandable desire of surviving relatives to participate in the 
criminal justice process, coupled with the perceived lack of balance which is 
said to occur when the victim is not permitted to address the jury, while 
members of the defendant's family are permitted to plead for the life of the 
defendant, contributed to the Court's abrupt departure from its earlier 
doctrine. In departing from Booth, however, the Supreme Court created a 
potential for uncertainty and confusion in capital jury sentencing that is 
likely to effect decisions by trial courts, prosecutors and defense attorneys 
for years to come. This article is an attempt to examine what has occurred in 
the Supreme Court regarding victim impact information.5 It will also explore 
2. Although the Supreme Court and various statutory formulations refer to the victim 
related material as "victim impact statements," see Payne, 501 U.S. at 821, at times during 
this article I have characterized the subject matter as "victim impact information." In my 
view, the term "victim impact statement" is underinclusive and misleading since it does not 
convey the full range of the material that a capital sentencing jury may be permitted to 
consider under the Payne decision. 
3. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Booth held by a 5-4 vote that victim impact statements were 
unconstitutional in capital jury sentencing under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of 
the United States' Constitution. Id. The Booth holding was also expressly reaffirmed in South 
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), in another 5-4 decision. 
4. Payne, 501 U.S. at 80. 
5. This article is primarily concerned with the problem victim impact information 
poses in capital sentencing where juries are playing a role in either imposing or 
recommending a sentence of death. Juries and jurors present special problems for the use of 
such information that are not as prevalent when a trial judge is considering a capital sentence. 
There is no constitutional requirement that a sentencing hearing in a capital case be 
conducted before a jury. See Harris v. Alabama, 115 S. Ct. 1031 (1995). In at least seven 
states the judge alone makes the determination as to sentence in capital cases. Alabama, see 
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1994 & Supp. 1996), Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 
(Supp. 1996), Idaho, see IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Supp. 1996), Montana, see MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 46-18-301 (1995), Nebraska, see NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (R.S. Supp. 1995). In 
contrast, Florida, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1996), and Indiana, see IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (Bums Supp. 1996), provide for the jury to make a non-binding 
recommendation to the judge. But "most states provide for a unitary capital trial in which the 
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what the future holds for courts attempting to set boundaries on the 
sentencing jury's consideration of such information. Finally, I will suggest 
some procedural safeguards that federal and state courts or legislatures 
concerned with capital cases should consider as they determine when it is 
appropriate to make this type of information part of its capital sentencing 
scheme. 
The Supreme Court has expressed its concern that a capital sentencing 
process should "facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing 
discretion."6 It has ruled that certain procedural safeguards must be put in 
place to make the procedure constitutional. However, by removing the bright 
line prohibition against victim impact information that the Supreme Court 
previously announced in Booth, it has allowed a potentially volatile category 
of evidence into capital cases without carefully explaining how it should be 
considered by a sentencing jury. State and federal law remains unclear as to 
jury adjudicate[s] guilt and punishment in a single proceeding." WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH 
PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF MODERN SYSTEMS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
73 (1991). 
Although when Booth was first decided the Supreme Court did not expressly comment 
on whether its holding applied to capital judge sentencing, most federal and state courts had 
no trouble in distinguishing Booth and limiting its reach to capital jury cases. See, e.g., Evans 
v. State, 563 N.E.2d 1251, 1263 (Ind. 1990); State v. McMillin, 783 S.w.2d 82,96 (Mo. 
1990) (distinguishing between victim impact testimony in judge and jury sentencing); 
Lightboume v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1987) (Booth exclusion not applicable to 
death sentence based on jury's recommendation and not jury verdict); Tibbs v. State, 528 
A.2d 510, 519 n.6 (Md. App. 1987) (holding that in a non-capital murder case, where victim's 
father gave evidence of both the impact of the crime on the family and made a 
recommendation of what he believed an appropriate sentence, neither circumstance 
constituted error). 
6. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320,329 (1985). In Caldwell, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that "[a] capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very 
unfamiliar situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice ... they 
are given only partial guidance as to how their judgment should be exercised, leaving them 
with substantial discretion." [d. at 333. 
The view that a jury should fix criminal punishment in many types of cases has existed 
in this country since the early 20th century. STAT. OF ARK. (Crawford & Moses 1921), ch. 44, 
§ 3203; 3 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. (Callaghan 1924); CODE OF VA. § 4784 (1919), VA. CODE § 
4784 (Michie 1936) ("The punishment in all criminal cases tried by a jury shall be ascertained 
by the jury trying the same within the limits prescribed by law.") (cited in Note, Should the 
Jury Fix the Punishment for Crimes?, 24 VA. L. REV. 462, 463-64 (1937». Such statutes were 
criticized at the time they were in effect, see Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A 
Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1306-07 (1937); Charles Kerr, 
A Needed Reform in Criminal Procedure, 6 Ky. LJ. 107,108 (1918), primarily because juries 
lack experience in determining what degree of punishment is appropriate. 
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how vIctlm impact evidence is relevant to establish statutorily relevant 
aggravating circumstances or how it should be considered as a sentencing 
factor. 
Not only do uncertainties exist that concern the relevance of such 
information, but consideration of the confrontation 7 problems presented by 
victim impact evidence have been largely unaddressed by the courts. 
Furthermore, legitimate questions arise regarding whether a defendant is 
entitled to any pre-trial disclosure of who the victims are, what they intend to 
present and how they intend to present their stories. This article advances the 
proposition that disclosure of victim impact information should be available 
at least in time for a capital defendant to consider his election of either a 
judge or a jury sentencing, where an election of the sentencer is available. 
I will ftrst examine the short but turbulent reign of Booth's per se ban of 
victim impact information and Payne's dramatic and controversial' reversal 
of Booth. Secondly, I will examine the history of victim participation in 
sentencing and the rise and influence of the modem "victims rights" 
movement on sentencing in general and capital sentencing in particular. 
Thirdly, I will examine the major criticisms of the use of victim impact 
information in capital sentencing, focusing particularly on the racial disparity 
that is likely to occur when the emphasis on capital sentencing is focused on 
the victim. Finally, I will offer some suggestions to improve the fairness in 
the use of victim impact information in capital cases for both defendants and 
victims. Hopefully, I will demonstrate why disclosure of victim impact 
evidence early in the capital case should be adopted as a threshold procedural 
safeguard if capital sentencing is to retain any integrity at all. 
The seriousness of capital jury sentencing, and the recognition that 
victim impact information is going to be a part of such sentencing in the 
foreseeable future, requires that serious attention be given to those matters 
left unaddressed by the Supreme Court. Lower courts will be required to 
resolve such concerns generated by the Supreme Court's recent 
pronouncement on victim impact information in Payne and the uncharted 
course set by that precedent. It is certain that any court involved in the 
process of administering the death penalty must confront the difftcult and 
recurring issues which are generated when a capital sentencing jury is asked 
to consider "victim impact" in the calculus of its "life or death decision." 
7. In neither Booth nor Payne was the Sixth Amendment confrontation provision 
discussed in any detail, but the elusive character of victim impact information raises serious 
questions about how, if at all, it can be rebutted. 
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II. THE RISE AND RUIN OF BOOTH v. MARYlAND: "RETHINKING THE 
EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY" 
371 
On June 15, 1987 , Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for a slim five justice 
majority, announced the first "bright line" exclusion of a category of 
evidence used by the prosecution in capital sentencing. Booth v. Maryianci8 
held that the introduction of a victim impact statement "at the sentencing 
phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment . . . ."9 The 
Booth case involved the killing of an elderly West Baltimore couple, 78-
year-old Irvin and 75-year-old Rose Bronstein. 1O John Booth, a neighbor of 
the Bronsteins, along with an accomplice, Willie Reid, entered the victim's 
home, apparently for the purpose of stealing money to buy drugs. I I After 
being bound and gagged, the victims were killed by repeated stab wounds in 
the chest with a kitchen knife. The Bronsteins were not discovered until two 
days later by their son.12 The jury found Booth guilty of two counts of first 
degree murder, two counts of robbery and two counts of conspiracy to 
commit robbery.13 The prosecution sought the death penalty and Booth 
elected to have his sentence determined by a jury instead of a judge.14 
8. 482 U.S. 496 (1987). Prior to the Booth case, several state courts had addressed the 
question of the admissibility of victim impact testimony and concluded that it should not be 
admitted. See, e.g., Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (testimony of 
victim's father regarding victim's character not proper rebuttal); Patterson v. State, 5 I3 So. 2d 
1263 (Fla. 1987) (victim impact and views of survivors not proper aggravation); Jones v. 
State, 738 P.2d 525 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (photos of victims inadmissible); Parker v. State, 
731 S.W.2d 756 (Ark. 1987) (victim's photos inadmissible); State v. Hope, 508 N.E.2d 202 
(III. 1986) (evidence and argument regarding victim's life required reversal); People v. Levitt, 
156 Cal. App. 3d 500 (1984) (bereavement of victim's family not proper factor for non-
capital sentencing). 
9. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509. Although the Supreme Court had never rendered an opinion 
excluding the admission of evidence under the Eighth Amendment prior to Booth, it had 
ruled, on a number of occasions that certain evidence could not be excluded if offered on 
behalf of a capital defendant. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), the Supreme Court 
invalidated an Ohio statute which precluded a capital defendant from introducing evidence 
intended to relate to his character and background. The case was followed by Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) and Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986). In 
Eddings, the court required that testimony of child neglect and abuse by the defendant's father 
be introduced. Skipper permitted a capital defendant to admit evidence of his "well behaved 
and peaceful adjustment to prison life." 
10. Booth, 482 U.S. at 497. 
II. [d. at 497-498. 
12. /d. at 498. 
13. /d. 
14. [d. (citing MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(b) (1982». Pursuant to Maryland law the 
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At the sentencing phase, the state offered into evidence a pre-sentence 
investigation report which included evidence of the effect of the crime on 
members of the Bronstein family.15 In Maryland, at the time Booth was 
tried, state law required that a victim impact statement be supplied as part of 
the pre-sentence investigation. 16 The relevant Maryland law specifically 
listed the information required to be collected and presented to the 
sentencing jury .17 
capital defendant is to be sentenced following the gUilty verdict "as soon as practicable." In 
most cases this means the sentencing would occur immediately following the trial, often the 
very next day. Under the statute the defendant would be permitted to waive the right to a jury 
and be sentenced by the judge. States vary as to what sentencing options it offers the capital 
defendant. See supra note 5. Nevertheless, the overwhelming preference for the option of a 
jury sentencing supports the notion that a jury decision as to the appropriate sentence in a 
capital case reflects the sentiment that the decision will represent the collective conscience of 
the community. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus, 
the defendant, in most jurisdictions, is at least offered the choice between the judge, a 
decision-making professional, or the members of the public. "Two thirds of the states with 
capital statutes and the federal government accord the jury final sentencing power." Katheryn 
K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty Cases, 46 ALA. 
L. REV. 5, 9 (1994). The popularity of jury trial provision in capital cases reflects "a 
reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a 
group of judges." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). 
15. Booth, 482 U.S. at 500. Victim impact statements are often part of a pre-sentence 
investigation report or contain some information that would ordinarily be contained in such 
reports. It has been suggested that such reports are "the single most important document at 
both the sentencing and correctional levels of the criminal process." Stephen A. Fennell & 
William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and Legal Analysis of the 
Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1615, 1623 (1980). 
16. [d. at 492 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 4-609(d) (1986)). In 1983, the Maryland 
General Assembly amended the VIS provision to provide that: 
In any case in which the death penalty . . . is requested ... a presentence 
investigation, including a victim impact statement ... shall be completed by the 
Division of Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by the court or jury before 
whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted .... 
§ 4-609(d) (1992). 
17. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498 (citing MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 4-609(c) (1986)). 
Specifically, the report shall: 
(i) Identify the victim of the offense; 
(ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of the offense; 
(iii)Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the offense along 
with its seriousness and permanence; 
(iv)Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial relationships as 
a result of the offense; 
(v) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the victim or the 
victim's family as a result of the offense; and 
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Interviews with the family by probation officials were the primary source 
of materials supplied in the report.l 8 The material collected from the family 
included interviews with the victims' son, daughter, son-in-law, and 
granddaughter.19 After some discussion between court and counsel, it was 
decided that the prosecutor would read the statement to the jury, rather than 
have family members testify before the jury .20 Defense counsel objected to 
the admission of the statement as both "irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, 
and that therefore its use . . . violated the Eighth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution ."21 
The information read to the sentencing jury included a list of the victims' 
surviving family members, including grandchildren, and reports of how 
family members felt when they first heard about the tragedy. The statement 
permitted the family to relate their religious tradition, to recall past family 
events with their slain relatives, and to tell the jury about the many people 
who attended the funera1.22 
In striking down the admission of the statement, the majority of the 
Supreme Court relied on the joint opinion in Gregg v. Georgia23 authored by 
Justices Stewart, Powell and Stevens. That opinion cautioned that a 
sentencing jury's discretion to impose a death sentence must be "suitably 
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and 
capricious action."24 After noting that the victim impact evidence admitted 
in the Booth case was of two varieties: first, information involving personal 
characteristics of the victim and emotional impact of the crime, and second, 
(vi)Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the 
victim or the victim's family that the trial court requires. 
§ 4-609(c)(3). 
18. Booth, 482 U.S. at 499. 
19. [d. 
20. /d. at SOl. It has been suggested that the written victim impact statement read to the 
jury is not as troublesome for a defendant as the victim's oral testimony. See also infra note 
200. 
21. [d. at 500-501. 
22. [d. at 509-515. The appendix to the opinion of the court contains the entire victim 
impact statement read to Booth's sentencing jury. It presents a clear picture of the almost 
limitless range of information that the trial judge considered from family members. 
At oral argument before the Supreme Court, George E. Bums, Jr., counsel for Booth, 
suggested that victim impact testimony in a capital case would be similar to executing a 
defendant based on the results of a public opinion poll. "An '800 number' linked to the 
courtroom would achieve the same purpose as a victim impact statement." 4 CRIM. L. RPT. 
4013 (BNA 1987) (reprinting argument of Booth v. Maryland on April 15, 1987). 
23. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
24. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189). 
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relating to the family members' opinions about the appropriate sentence, the 
court concluded that neither category of information was relevant to the 
capital sentencing decision.25 
The Court held that the admission of the evidence created for Booth "a 
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death penalty 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner."26 In excluding the evidence, the 
Court rejected the argument that the personal loss of the family members 
should be considered a "circumstance" of the crime.27 The Court expressed 
concern that the defendant might be punished as a result of consequences he 
could not have been aware of at the time he selected his victim.28 The Court 
25. [d. at 502. 
26. [d. at 503. The Court's focus on avoiding arbitrary and capricious capital sentences 
was not surprising. In the absence of precedent excluding a category of information from the 
traditionally broad discretion afforded judges in sentencing, see Williams v. New York, 337 
U.S. 241, 244-45 (1949) (recognizing that sentencing judges have wide discretion as to the 
sources and types of information to consider at sentencing), the Court needed a basis for 
limiting what jurors could take into account. The Court had little choice other than to rely on 
the broad "arbitrary and capricious" doctrine it had developed in its post-1972 jurisprudence. 
See e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring). The 
Supreme Court's decision in Furman, which produced multiple sets of concurring opinions 
critical of the manner in which the death penalty was being administered at that time, 
provided the basis for relief when the Court believed state punishment schemes were unfairly 
administered. /d. 
The principal theme on which consensus could be reached in Furman was that even if 
the punishment could, in theory, be constitutionally applied, the unguided, standardless, 
discretion resulted in unfair and inconsistent results. Citing the Eighth Amendment's cruel 
and unusual punishment proscriptions, one justice described the process in place across the 
country at the time as arbitrary as being "struck by lightening." [d. at 309 (Stewart, J. 
concurring). Capital punishment statutes were thereafter required to provide guidance for the 
jury with adequate procedural safeguards. The Court spelled out some of those safeguards in a 
set of opinions issued on the same day in 1976 which authorized statutes that included (1) a 
two-part trial where the gUilt/innocence determination is separated from the sentencing 
determination (bifurcation); (2) a specific list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances to 
limit the jury's discretion; and (3) automatic appellate review. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 
262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
27. Booth, 482 U.S. at 502-03. 
28. [d. at 504. A fundamental debate which undergirds the question of what sentencing 
criteria are appropriate to consider involves the determination of what circumstances society 
intends to punish. Simply stated, is a person punished for his or her actions and intentions or 
should the punishment also reflect the full scope of the harm caused by the offender? This 
question is not unique to capital punishment or criminal law. The classic debate over the 
appropriate scope of punishment for offenders involved in homicide prosecutions under both 
the common law and statutory felony murder doctrine provides rich examples of the 
problematic policy concerns encountered when courts attempt to draw the line. See generally 
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was also particularly "troubled by the implication that defendants whose 
victims were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment 
than those whose victims are perceived to be less worthy."29 
The Court also pointed out several potential problems encountered by 
the defendant attempting to rebut such evidence, noting, among other things, 
the "strategic risks of attacking the victim's character before the jury."30 In 
two separate opinions, Justice White and Justice Scalia dissented, each of 
those opinions was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor. 
Justice White's opinion concluded that since the Maryland legislature 
had decided that the sentencing jury should hear the degree of harm that the 
defendant had caused, its judgment was "entitled to particular deference" 
since sentencing considerations are "peculiarly' questions of legislative 
policy."31 Noting that victim impact information is regularly used in non-
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980) (explaining the historical development of the 
felony murder rule and limiting its application); David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In 
Defense of The Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'y 359 (1985) (arguing in 
favor of the felony murder rule). 
Tort doctrine regarding the foreseeability of the harm as the test for the limits of civil 
liability have also been plagued with controversy. See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984). 
29. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 n.8. The problem of whether the criminal justice system 
should recognize that the taking of some lives should require a greater punishment than others 
is a difficult one to avoid. In the celebrated Charles Lindberg baby kidnapping case, see State 
v. Hauptmann, 115 NJ.L. 412, 180 A. 809 (1935), public hysteria over the crime and the 
enormous popUlarity of the family of the victim not only influenced the death sentence in that 
case but also changed the national law on felony murder, burglary and kidnapping following 
the case. See AMORE A. MOENSSENS, CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL LAW 501-02 (5th 
ed. 1992) (1973). A jury sharing a general view of a victim's importance to society will likely 
bring that view into the jury room when it makes its decision in a capital case. One common 
example of victim preference is that many capital punishment statutes include, as an 
aggravating circumstance, the killing of a police officer in the line of duty. See, e.g., GA. 
CODE ANN. § 17-10-30(b)(8) (Harrison 1994). Such statutes reflect a public legislative 
determination that the killing of a police officer is more deserving of severe punishment than 
the killing of an ordinary citizen. 
30. Booth, 482 U.S. at 507. 
31. Id. at 515 (White, J. dissenting) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (quoting Gore v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958»). Justice White's assessment of the legislature's 
traditionally broad role in sentencing is well founded. As one commentator cogently 
explained: 
[t]he legislature determines the kind and potential degree of punishment involved for 
each offense and the identity of the sentencing authority. The legislature's sentencing 
system should reflect its underlying view of the purposes served by the criminal 
sanction-retribution, specific and general deterrence, incapacitation, or 
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capital contexts, he suggested it was particularly appropriate to consider in a 
capital case.32 Justice White characterized the concerns over the differing 
ability of family members to articulate the extent of their loss as "a make 
weight consideration."33 Justice White dismissed the majority's concern over 
problems of rebutting victim impact evidence by pointing out that in the 
instant case such concerns were purely hypothetica1.34 Justice White also felt 
compelled to comment that if there were some disadvantage to the defendant, 
who in pressing hard to rebut a victim impact statement offended the jury, he 
should not "be heard to complain of the consequences of his tactical 
decisions."35 
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia emphasized his view that "the 
amount of harm one causes does bear upon the extent of his 'personal 
responsibility.' "36 Questioning whether there was constitutional or historical 
support for such a limitation on the imposition of capital punishment, Justice 
Scalia noted the perception of unfairness generated by the absence of 
victim's input into the capital sentencing process.37 
Although the Court was closely divided, the majority opinion left little 
flexibility to permit direct victim participation in capital cases. It appeared 
that at least for the foreseeable future, the use of victim impact evidence of 
rehabilitation .... The criminal process should be structured to promote the 
legislature's sentencing system and goals. 
Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger 
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. LJ. 185,198-99 (1983). 
32. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515-16. 
33. Id.at518. 
34. Id. at 518, n.3. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 519 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
37. Id. at 520. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's views were embraced by several 
commentators after the Booth decision. See, e.g., Paul Boudreaux, Booth v. Maryland and the 
Individual Vengeance Rationale for Criminal Punishment, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
177 (1989) (it may be proper to permit family anguish to be considered in order to satisfy a 
sense of justice); Lester K. Syren, Booth v. Maryland: Whether Victim Impact Statements are 
Unconstitutional in Death Penalty Cases, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'y. 171 
(1989) (without victim impact evidence, capital juries are sentencing with "impaired vision"); 
Jackson R. Sharman, III, Comment, Victim Impact Statements and the Eighth Amendment-
Booth v. Maryland 107 S. Ct. 2529 (1987), II HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'y. 583 (1988) 
(considered the decision in Booth a "willful disregard for a democratic choice," since the 
citizens of Maryland had passed the victim impact evidence statute); Regina A. Jones, 
Comment, Eighth Amendment Prohibits Introduction of Victim Impact Evidence of Sentencing 
Phase of Capital Murder Trial, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 1159 (1988) (accusing Supreme Court of 
overstepping the bounds of proper judicial review in Booth by issuing a per se blanket 
exclusion of victim impact information). 
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the type presented in Booth, designed to influence the imposition of the death 
sentence, was a closed question-despite the "victim based" concerns of the 
Booth dissenters. However, South Carolina prosecutors, who were reluctant 
to give up a powerful tool in their capital sentencing arsenal, brought another 
victim impact case to the Supreme Court less than two years after the Booth 
decision. In South Carolina v. Gathers,38 the death sentence of Demetrius 
Gathers had been overturned by the South Carolina Supreme Court.39 
The case involved the killing of Richard Haynes who Gathers 
encountered in a park. Along with some companions, Gathers beat and 
kicked Haynes severely, smashed a bottle and umbrella over his head and 
ultimately inserted the umbrella into his anus.4O According to the evidence, 
the beating resulted when Gathers attempted to initiate a conversation with 
Haynes.41 Haynes was a 31-year-old unemployed man who had spent some 
time in mental hospitals. He considered himself a minister, although he had 
no formal religious training and carried with him two bibles and other 
religious articles including religious tracts, one of which was entitled "The 
Game Guy's Prayer."42 After the altercation, Gathers and the others 
rummaged through Haynes' pockets and scattered his personal belongings 
and the religious tracts.43 
The articles found at the scene were admitted into evidence without 
objection. At the sentencing phase, the prosecutor made "extensive 
comments" to the jury about the victim's religious nature.44 
38. 490 U.s. 805 (1989). 
39. Jd. at 810. 
40. [d. at 806-07. 
41. [d. at 807. 
42. [d. 
43. [d. 
44. [d. at 808- 10. Although offering no direct victim impact testimony, the South 
Carolina prosecutor offered the following arguments to the sentencing jury: 
We know from the proof that Reverend Minister Haynes was a religious person. He 
had his religious items out there. This defendant strewn [sic] them across the bike 
path, thinking nothing of that. 
Among the many cards that Reverend Haynes had among his belongings was this 
card .... He had this [sic] religious items, his beads. He had a plastic angel. Of 
course, he is now with the angels now, but this defendant Demetrius Gathers could 
care little about the fact that he is a religious person. Cared little of the pain and 
agony he inflicted upon a person who is trying to enjoy one of our public parks. 
But look at Reverend Minister Haynes' prayer. It's called the Game Guy's Prayer. 
"Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask for any easy 
place in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me. I only ask you for the stuff to 
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Relying on Booth v. Maryland, the South Carolina Supreme Court 
reversed the death sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing. 
South Carolina appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Justice 
Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, 
affirmed the South Carolina court and extended the victim impact 
information prohibition to the prosecutor's closing arguments. Rejecting 
South Carolina's argument that the prosecutor's comments were only 
arguments relating to the circumstances of the crime, Justice Brennan 
reasoned: 
The fact that Gathers scattered Haynes' personal papers around his body 
while going through them looking for something to steal was certainly a 
relevant circumstance of the crime, and thus a proper subject for comment. 
But the prosecutor's argument in this case went well beyond that fact: he 
read to the jury at length from the religious tract the victim was carrying and 
commented on the personal qualities he inferred from Haynes' possession of 
the "Game Guy's Prayer" and the voter registration card. The content of 
these cards, however, cannot possibly have been relevant to the 
"circumstances of the crime." There is no evidence whatever that the 
defendant read anything that was printed on either the tract or the voter card. 
Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that he did so.45 
Justice White, reluctantly joined the majority, concluding that he must 
join Brennan's opinion unless Booth was to be overruled.46 
Justice O'Connor authored a dissenting opinion, joined by the Chief 
Justice and Justice Kennedy, in which she advanced the view that Booth was 
wrongly decided, and stated that she stood "ready to overrule it if the court 
would do so .... "47 Justice O'Connor, however, suggested an alternative to 
requiring that Booth be overruled in order to reinstate Gathers' death 
sentence. She reasoned that the statements made by the prosecution in 
Gathers' could be distinguished from those in Booth since that case involved 
statements of harm to the victim's family and the statements at issue in 
give you one hundred percent of what I have got. If all the hard drives seem to come 
my way, I thank you for the compliment. Help me to remember that you won't ever 
let anything come my way that you and I together can't handle. And help me to take 
the bad break as part of the game .... " 
45. Id.at811. 
46. Id. at 812. (White, J., concurring). 
47. Id. at 813-14. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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Gathers were "solely prosecutorial comments about the victim himself."48 
She urged the majority to recognize "[t]he fact that there is a victim, and 
facts about the victim properly developed during the course of the trial, are 
not so far outside the realm of circumstances of the crime .... "49 
In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia endorsed the immediate overruling of 
Booth. He believed that the state should decide whether it wished to consider 
victim impact evidence at capital sentencing proceedings. He wrote that it 
would be "a violation of my oath to adhere to what I consider a plainly 
unjustified intrusion upon the democratic process in order that the Court 
might save face."50 In reviewing his earlier attack on the validity of the 
Booth decision, Justice Scalia wrote that "Booth has not even an arguable 
basis in the common law background that led up to the Eighth Amendment 
"51 
48. Jd. at 814. Interestingly, in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397-98 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., dissenting) (1988), decided in the term after Booth, three justices joined the dissenting 
opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist which suggested that Booth's application should not 
extend to comments about the victim himself. Justice Kennedy had recently joined the Court. 
It would have appeared that there were at least five justices who by that time, had expressed a 
less restrictive view of Booth: the Chief Justice, Justice White, Justice O'Connor and now 
Justice Kennedy. Justice White, the other original dissenter in Booth, however, was in the 
majority in Mills, which reversed the conviction of the capital defendant on a jury instruction 
issue unrelated to victim impact evidence. In fact, he authored the opinion of the Court. 
Perhaps the replacement of Justice Powell, the author of Booth, with Justice Kennedy, who in 
his first term seemed willing to disagree with the sweeping conclusions about the 
admissibility of victim impact announced in Booth, would have logically resulted in the 
conclusion that Booth was ripe to be overruled in Gathers. Justice White's reluctance to 
abandon precedent so readily, see supra note 46, ironically resulted in an expansion of Booth 
in Gathers, despite a majority of justices that had already announced their disagreement with 
the general rule established just one year earlier. 
49. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 816 (citation omitted). Statements about the victim of the 
killing can be more easily justified as "circumstances of the crime" than comments by 
surviving victims about their grief. The facts clearly indicate that Gathers knew what his 
victim was doing at the time he killed him. Jd. at 815 (O'Connor, 1., dissenting). In this 
regard, the South Carolina prosecutors and Justice O'Connor may well have been correct. 
Indeed, the state of South Carolina devoted all but a page and a half of its petition for 
certiorari's "reason for granting the writ" to making the point that O'Connor stressed in her 
dissent. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, petition for cert. filed (Aug. 5, 1988) 
(No. 18-30). 
50. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 825. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
'51. Jd. Justice Scalia commented that he doubted "overruling Booth will so shake the 
citizenry's faith in the Court." Jd. at 824. He further urged that if Booth was going to be 
overruled it should occur as soon as possible. Justice Scalia reasoned that: 
[tJhe respect accorded prior decisions increases, rather than decreases, with their 
antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, and the surrounding law 
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It certainly appeared that even though Booth and Gathers were narrow 5-
4 decisions, that the doctrine excluding victim impact was expanding and 
state courts were treating the Booth/Gathers duo as mandating limits on all 
forms of victim impact evidence.52 Furthermore, considerable scholarly 
commentary endorsed the legitimacy of the Booth/Gathers victim impact 
prohibitions.53 
Those who were disappointed that victims would have no voice in 
capital jury sentencing would not have long to wait for the court to examine 
its position on victim impact testimony. On the very last day of the 1990-
1991 Term, the Supreme Court overturned the Booth/Gathers per se bar 
excluding victim's impact evidence in capital jury sentencing in its 
controversial 6-3 decision in Payne.54 Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the 
Court's opinion that ended the brief reign of Booth as a formidable obstacle 
becomes premised upon their validity. The freshness of error not only deprives it of 
the respect to which long-established practice is entitled, but also counsels that the 
opportunity of correction be seized at once, before state and federal laws and 
practices have been adjusted to embody it. That is particularly true with respect to a 
decision such as Booth, which is in that line of cases purporting to reflect "evolving 
standards of decency" applicable to capital punishment. 
Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,101 (1958». 
52. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d 236, 254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (daughter's 
statement about the magnitude of her loss when defendant murdered her mother and her 
recommendation of the appropriate sentence mandated reversal in light of Booth); State v. 
Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575 A.2d 816 (1990) (prosecution argument that the jury should 
render a death sentence "even if it is just for the victim," was reversible error); State v. 
Clausell, 121 N J. 298, 580 A.2d 221 (1990) (prosecutor may not divert the jury from material 
facts by undue emphasis on the "worthiness" of victim designed to excite the jury); Jackson v. 
Dugger, 547 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1989) (officer.'s testimony detailing the impact of the victim 
officer's death on fellow police officers was improper). 
53. For examples of commentary endorsing the Booth decision, see Susan J. Jump, 
Comment, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Victim Impact Statements During Sentencing 
Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 GA. L. REV. 1191, 1213 (1987) ("the rights of defendants 
convicted of capital crimes cannot be sacrificed or infringed upon due to concerns for the 
victims"); Kevin J. McCoy, Note, Preserving Integrity in Capital Sentencing: Booth v. 
Maryland, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 333,350 (1988) ("Booth stands as a sound decision which 
should help further understanding of the Court's consistent admonitions against arbitrariness 
in sentencing .... "); Charlton T. Howard, ill, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Death Knell for the 
Victim Impact Statement?, 47 MD. L. REV. 701, 731 (1988) ("formalized role for the victim at 
sentencing, no matter what its specific form, detracts from the sentencing authority's focus on 
the defendant and imperils the very concept of individualized sentencing"). 
54. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). 
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to death penalty prosecution and which had been an aggravation to victim's 
rights advocates.55 
In that Tennessee murder case the prosecution established that Payne's 
victims were 28-year-old Charisse Christopher, her two-year-old daughter, 
Lacie, and her three-year-old son, Nicholas. The three lived together in an 
apartment across the hall from Payne's girlfriend.56 According to the State's 
evidence, on Saturday , June 27, 1987, Payne visited his girlfriend's 
apartment expecting her to return from out of town. While he waited, he 
passed the time injecting cocaine and drinking beer.57 After leaving the 
apartment for a time, Payne returned, but rather than returning to his 
girlfriend's apartment, he entered the Christopher's apartment and began 
making sexual advances towards Charisse.58 
When she resisted his advances, Payne became violent and a downstairs 
neighbor reported hearing a "blood curdling scream" from the Christopher 
residence.59 Police responded to the scene and observed Payne covered with 
blood.60 Payne struck the officer and fled.61 Further investigation revealed 
that Charisse Christopher and her children were lying on the kitchen floor, 
suffering from multiple stab wounds. Charisse and Lacie were dead; 
Nicholas, however, survived his serious injuries.62 
55. See sources cited above in note 37. 





61. [d. at 812 (citing State v. Payne, 791 S.w.2d 10, 12 (Tenn. 1990». 
62. /d. The Court in its opinion drew from the lower court painful details of the murder 
scene as discovered by the authorities: 
Inside the apartment, the police encountered a horrifying scene. Blood covered the 
walls and floor throughout the unit. Chari sse and her children were lying on the floor 
in the kitchen. Nicholas, despite several wounds inflicted by a butcher knife that 
completely penetrated through his body from front to back, was still breathing. 
Miraculously, he survived, but not until after undergoing seven hours of surgery and 
a transfusion of 1700 cc's of blood-400 to 500 cc's more than his estimated normal 
blood volume. Charisse and Lacie were dead. 
Charisse's body was found on the kitchen floor on her back, her legs fully extended. 
She had sustained 42 direct knife wounds and 42 defensive wounds on her arms and 
hands. The wounds were caused by 41 separate thrusts of a butcher knife. None of 
the 84 wounds inflicted by Payne were individually fatal; rather, the cause of death 
was most likely bleeding from all of the wounds. 
Lacie's body was on the kitchen floor near her mother. She had suffered stab wounds 
to the chest, abdomen, back, and head. The murder weapon, a butcher knife, was 
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Payne was later apprehended. In its opinion, the Supreme Court 
characterized the evidence against Payne as "overwhelming" and 
"uncontroverted ."63 
The jury, obviously persuaded that the evidence was at least adequate, 
returned guilty verdicts against Payne on all counts.64 
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the defense presented evidence of 
four witnesses: a clinical psychologist, Payne's mother, father, girlfriend, and 
Bobbie Thomas.65 Dr. John T. Huston testified that Payne's low IQ score 
qualified him as mentally handicapped and found him to be "the most polite 
prisoner he had ever met."66 The doctor, however, found no evidence to 
support that Payne was either "psychotic" or "schizophrenic."67 
Payne's parents testified their son had no prior criminal record and no 
history of drug or alcohol abuse.68 Bobbie Thomas, Payne's girlfriend at the 
time of the incident, corroborated the testimony of Payne's parents.69 She 
stated that she met Payne in church and that he was a caring person who 
"behaved just like a father" to her three children.70 
The state countered with the victim impact testimony of Charisse 
Christopher's mother, Mary Zvolanek, who described how the murder of 
Charisse and Lacie had affected Nicholas.71 The prosecutor referred to the 
found at her feet. Payne's baseball cap was snapped on her arm near her elbow. Three 
cans of malt liquor bearing Payne's fingerprints were found on a table near her body, 
and a fourth empty one was on the landing outside the apartment door. 
Payne was apprehended later that day hiding in the attic of the home of a former 
girlfriend. As he descended the stairs of the attic, he stated to the arresting officers, 
"Man, I ain't killed no woman .... " According to one of the officers, Payne had "a 
wild look about him. His pupils were contracted. He was foaming at the mouth, 
saliva. He appeared to be very nervous. He was breathing real rapid .... " He had 
blood on his body and clothes and several scratches across his chest. It was later 
determined that the blood stains matched. 
/d. at 812-13 (citing State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Tenn. 1990» (citation omitted). 
63. [d. at 812-13. 
64. [d. at 813. 






71. [d. Zvolanek's testimony about Nicholas was cited by the court as follows: 
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home. 
And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and 
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emotional testimony of Zvolanek and discussed the long-tenn victim impact 
extensively in his closing argument,72 urging that the jury return with the 
death penalty. The jury imposed death on each of the two murder counts.73 
Seizing the opportunity to strike down the Booth/Gathers victim impact 
exclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed the general principles to be 
applied when the Supreme Court considers overruling one of its prior 
precedents.74 The Chief Justice noted that "when governing decisions are 
asks me, Grandmama, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm 
worried about my Lacie. 
[d. at 814-15. 
72. [d. at 815. The prosecutor's argument referring to the impact of the crime on 
Nicholas was as follows: 
[d. 
There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of any of the families involved in 
this case. There is nothing you can do to ease the pain of Bernice or Carl Payne, and 
that's a tragedy. There is nothing you can do basically to ease the pain of Mr. and 
Mrs. Zvolanek, and that's a tragedy. They will have to live with it the rest of their 
lives. There is obviously nothing you can do for Charisse and Lacie Jo. But there is 
something that you can do for Nicholas. 
Somewhere down the road Nicholas is going to grow up, hopefully. He's going to 
want to know what happened. And he is going to know what happened to his baby 
sister and his mother. He is going to want to know what type of justice was done. He 
is going to want to know what happened. With your verdict, you will provide the 
answer. 
During his comments on rebuttal, the prosecutor made additional references to the 
impact of the crime on Nicholas: 
No one will ever know about Lacie Jo because she never had the chance to grow 
up. Her life was taken from her at the age of two years old. So, no there won't be a 
high school principal to talk about Lacie Jo Christopher, and there won't be anybody 
to take her to her high school prom. And there won't be anybody there-there won't 
be her mother there or Nicholas' mother there to kiss him at night. His mother will 
never kiss him good night or pat him as he goes off to bed, or hold him and sing him 
a lullaby. 
[Petitioner's attorney] wants you to think about a good reputation, people who 
love the defendant and things about him. He doesn't want you to think about the 
people who love Chari sse Christopher, her mother and daddy who loved her. The 
people who loved little Lacie Jo, the grandparents who are still here. The brother who 
mourns for her every single day and wants to know where his best little playmate is. 
He doesn't have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the 
things that go into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that 
child will carry forever. 
[d. at 816. 
73. [d. 
74. /d. at 828. 
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unworkable or badly reasoned, the Court has never felt constrained to follow 
precedent."75 In reasoning that the Booth/Gathers doctrine was unworkable, 
the Chief Justice examined the philosophy and history of sentencing.76 
Citing the 18th century Italian criminologist Cesare Beccana, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist said that the notion "the punishment should fit the crime" has long 
been a guiding principle of sentencing.77 
He vigorously complained that the Booth/Gathers principle was unfair to 
the state since "the State is barred from either offering 'a quick glimpse of 
the life' which a defendant 'chose to extinguish' or demonstrating the loss to 
the victim's family and to society."78 
Seizing upon Justice O'Connor's earlier dissent in Gathers, Rehnquist 
wrote that "Booth deprives the State of the full moral force of its evidence 
.... "79 Chief Justice Rehnquist seemed particularly annoyed by the fact that 
in Payne the defendant was able to place evidence of his good character 
before the jury but the State was not able to do the same regarding the 
victims.80 
75. Id. at 827. 
76. Id. at 819-20. 
77. Id.at819. 
78~ Id. at 822 (quoting Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 397 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting». Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Exodus 21:22-23; JAMES A. FARRER, CRIMES AND 
PuNISHMENTS 199 (London 1880); and S. ANTON WHEELER ET. AL., SIlTING IN JUDGMENT: 
THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 56 (1988), in support of the proposition that 
the punishment should fit the crime. /d. at 819-20. Implicit in Rehnquist's assertions is the 
principle of retribution. The Supreme Court has often addressed such a punishment objective. 
For example, in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the Supreme Court, quoting Justice 
Potter Stewart, commented on the value of retribution: 
[t]he instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct 
in the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the 
stability of society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized 
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they 
"deserve," then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, 
and lynch law. 
Id. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.s. 238, 308 (1972». 
79. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825. 
80. Id. at 826. Justice Rehnquist quoted the Supreme Court of Tennessee in making his 
point: 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in this case obviously felt the unfairness of the rule 
pronounced by Booth when it said: "It is an affront to the civilized members of the 
human race to say that at sentencing in a capital case, a parade of witnesses may 
praise the background, character and good deeds of Defendant (as was done in this. 
case), without limitation as to relevancy, but nothing may be said that bears upon the 
character of, or the harm imposed, upon the victims." 
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The Court reasoned that such testimony was relevant and perfectly 
consistent with the traditional latitude of the states to devise procedures for 
the use of victim impact information.81 First, it said that if evidence was "so 
unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for 
relief."82 The Court further noted that it was only addressing the 
admissibility of evidence and argument relating to the impact of the victim's 
death on the family and not characterizations and opinions about the crime 
and the appropriateness of a death sentence that was part of the evidence at 
issue in Booth.83 No evidence of such opinions or characterizations were at 
issue in Payne. 
Payne also produced three concurring opinions which appeared to be an 
attempt to explain or justify Rehnquist's abrupt departure from precedent. 
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that a State may determine that 
victim-impact testimony is relevant to a capital sentencing decision, relying 
primarily on a societal consensus in support of allowing the evidence.84 
Justice O'Connor relied heavily on a due process analysis to conclude that 
the result in Payne was appropriate.85 
Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, vigorously attacked the dissent 
of Justice Thurgood Marshall.86 In his substantive discussion of victim 
impact evidence, he not only relied on societal acceptance of victim impact 
information but harshly criticized the line of cases beginning with Locketr87 
which entitled the defendant to have broad latitude in presenting mitigating 
evidence to the sentencing jury. 88 
A separate concurrence by Justice Souter and joined by Justice Kennedy 
focused on the fact that impact on the victim's survivors is a foreseeable 
consequence of murder and that it was not unreasonable to conclude that the 
defendant should be assessed for the consequences of the risk he assumed.89 
/d. (quoting State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990». 
81. Jd. at 824-25. 
82. /d. at 825. 
83. /d. at 830 n.2. 
84. Jd. at 830-31. (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
85. Jd. at 831-32 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). 
86. Jd. at 833-34 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Marshall's dissent is discussed in detail 
infra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. 
87. Jd. at 833. See supra note 9. 
88. Jd. at 833-34. 
89. Jd. at 838-39. According to Justice Souter: 
Le]very defendant knows, if endowed with the mental competence for criminal 
responsibility, that the life he will take by his homicidal behavior is that of a unique 
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Using an elaborate hypothetical, he reasoned that Booth should be overruled 
because it embraced a standard that was unworkable and could lead to 
potentially arbitrary results.90 . 
In a blistering dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the court for its casual 
departure from precedent. He noted that the majority made no "extraordinary 
showing"91 before overruling its recent decisions in Booth and Gathers and 
expressed disbelief in the majority's "radical assertion that it need not even 
try ."92 Warning that the Court's action in Payne paid little respect to 
precedent, he identified several potential cases that might be ripe for 
reexamination and revision under the court's analysis in Payne.93 He 
person, like himself, and that the person to be killed probably has close associates, 
"survivors," who will suffer harms and deprivations from the victim's death. 
[d. at 838. 
90. [d. at 839-41. Justice Souter's concurring opinion posed the following hypothetical 
situation: 
Assume that a minister, unidentified as such and wearing no clerical collar, walks 
down a street to his church office on a brief errand, while his wife and adolescent 
daughter wait for him in a parked car. He is robbed and killed by a stranger, and his 
survivors witness his death. What are the circumstances of the crime that can be 
considered at the sentencing phase under Booth? The defendant did not know his 
victim was a minister, or that he had a wife and child, let alone that they were 
watching. Under Booth, these facts were irrelevant to his decision to kill, and they 
should be barred from consideration at sentencing. Yet evidence of them will surely 
be admitted at the gUilt phase of the trial. The widow will testify to what she saw, 
and, in so doing, she will not be asked to pretend that she was a mere bystander. She 
could not succeed at that if she tried. The daughter may well testify too. The jury will 
not be kept from knowing that the victim was a minister, with a wife and child, on an 
errand to his church. This is so not only because the widow will not try to deceive the 
jury about her relationship, but also because the usual standards of trial relevance 
afford factfinders enough information about surrounding circumstances to let them 
make sense of the narrowly material facts of the crime itself. 
91. [d. at 848. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
92. [d. In an almost prophetic memorandum written by one of Marshall's law clerks to 
the late Justice in the Booth case, it was advised that he should "[flight like hell on this one." 
BENCH MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE MARSHALL re Booth v. Maryland at 7, March 24, 1987 
(reproduced from the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Collections of the Manuscript Division, 
Library of Congress). The clerk warned that "[Marshall's] prior rejection of retribution as a 
justification for the death penalty, plus the risk of arbitrary results, should make this a close 
case legally and morally for the right wingers." [d. 
The memorandum's comments foreshadowed the extraordinary constitutional litigation 
that followed the Booth case and the eventual "right wing" victory in Payne, particularly the 
persistent efforts of the conservatives to reexamine the victim's impact issue. See infra 
note III. 
93. Payne, 501 U.S. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall referred to 
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asserted that "[p]ower, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's 
decisionmaking."94 Lamenting the possible future consequences of the 
Court's decision, Justice Marshall wrote: "Cast aside today are those 
condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's victims may be 
minorities, women, or the indigent. Inevitably, this campaign to resurrect 
yesterday's 'spirited dissents' will squander the authority and the legitimacy 
of this court as a protector of the powerless."95 
several decisions at risk of being overruled as follows: Metro Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 
547 (1990) (authority of Federal government to set aside broadcast licenses for minority 
applicants); Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) (First Amendment right 
not to be denied public employment on the basis of party affiliation); Peel v. Attorney 
Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990) (First Amendment right to 
advertise legal specialization); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990) (right under Double 
Jeopardy Clause not to be subjected twice to prosecution for same criminal conduct); 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (due process right to procedural safeguards aimed at 
assuring a voluntary decision to commit oneself to mental hospital); James v. Illinois, 493 
U.S. 307 (1990) (Fourth Amendment right to exclusion of illegally obtained evidence 
introduced for impeachment of defense witness); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988) 
(Eighth Amendment right to jury instructions that do not preclude consideration of 
nonunanimous mitigating factors in capital sentencing); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 
149 (1987) (right to promotions as remedy for racial discrimination in government hiring); 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (Eighth Amendment right not to be executed if 
insane); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 
(1986) (reaffirming right to abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973»; 
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (Establishment Clause bar on governmental financial 
assistance to parochial schools); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (First 
Amendment right of public employee to express views on matter of public concern); Rock v. 
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (Fifth Amendment and Sixth Amendment right of criminal 
defendant to provide hypnotically refreshed testimony on his own behalf); Gray v. 
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (rejecting applicability of harmless error analysis to Eighth 
Amendment right not to be sentenced to death by "death ·qualified" jury); Maine v. Moulton, 
474 U.S. 159 (1985) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel violated by introduction of 
statements made to government informant-codefendant in course of preparing defense 
strategy); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (rejecting theory 
that Tenth Amendment provides immunity to states from federal regulation); Pulliam v. 
Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (right to obtain injunctive relief from constitutional violations 
committed by judicial officials). 
94. Payne, 501 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall warned that "the 
continued vitality of literally scores of decisions must be understood to depend on nothing 
more than the proclivities of the individuals whom now comprise a majority of this Court." /d. 
at 851. See Ranae Bartlett, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: Eviscerating the Doctrine of Stare 
Decisis in Constitutional Law Cases, 45 ARK. L. REV. 561 (1992). 
95. Payne, 501 U.s. at 856 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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The controversial dissenting opinion marked the end to Justice 
Marshall's twenty-four year career as an associate justice of the Supreme 
Court.96 
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 
Blackmun,97 in which he described the majority's decision as representing "a 
dramatic departure" from settled principles of capital sentencing 
jurisprudence.98 He believed that the Payne decision could only be intended 
to appeal to the "sympathies" and "emotions" of jurors, which had always 
been patently improper in capital punishment cases.99 He wrote: 
Irrelevant victim impact evidence that distracts the sentence from the proper 
focus of sentencing and encourages reliance on emotion and other arbitrary 
factors necessarily prejudices the defendant. 
The majority's apparent inability to understand this fact is highlighted by its 
misunderstanding of Justice Powell's argument in Booth that admission of 
victim impact evidence is undesirable because it risks shifting the focus of 
the sentencing hearing away from the defendant and the circumstances of the 
crime and creating a '''mini-trial' on the victim's character." Booth found 
this risk insupportable not, as today's majority suggests, because it creates a 
"tactical" "dilemma" for the defendant, but because it allows the possibility 
that the jury will be so distracted by prejudicial and irrelevant considerations 
that it will base its life-or-death decision on whim or caprice. I 00 
Justice Stevens made it clear that he believed that the underlying 
premises upon which the Booth decision was based were constitutionally 
96. Justice Marshall announced his retirement on the day that Payne was decided. 
Although he did not publicly criticize his colleagues regarding Payne, popular accounts 
suggest that the Payne decision left the Court's members angry and divided, and Justice 
Marshall bitter. See DAVID G. SAVAGE, TuRNIlI!G RIGHT, THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST 
SUPREME COURT 418-20 (1992). One Supreme Court observer went so far as to report that the 
tone of the court was "rancor[ous]" and "insult[ing]" and that there was "blood on the 
conference room floor ... " during the months prior to the final alignment in Payne being 
reached. CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: THE WORLD OF JUSTICE 
THURGOOD MARSHALL 403 (1993). During this very tense period on the Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist was described as "unaffected, and around the Court he was in an especially chipper 
mood." SAVAGE, supra, at 408. 
97. Payne, SOl U.S. at 856 (Stevens,J., dissenting). 
98. [d. 
99. [d. at 858-59. 
100. [d. at 864 (citations omitted). 
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sound. Soon after the Payne decision was announced, many lower courts 
anxiously embraced it. 10 1 
The 6-3 Supreme Court vote in Payne ended the five years of 
speculation regarding how long the controversial constitutional bar to victim 
impact evidence would stand, in light of the changing personnel on the 
Supreme Court. The addition of Justice Souter to the Court in 1990, who 
sided with those overruling the Booth decision, combined with the retirement 
of Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1991, on the day Payne was decided, 
reinforced the continuing validity of victim impact evidence in capital cases. 
The appointment of conservative Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme 
Court as Marshall's replacement by President George Bush,102 combined 
with the 1993 retirement of Justice Harry Blackmun, removed from the 
Court another Justice who had voted in favor of the bar to victim impact 
evidence in Booth .103 
101. See Black v. Collins, 962 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1992) (prosecution argument that 
victim was a hard-working devoted wife and mother was not inflammatory or fundamentally 
unfair); Arizona v. Atwood, 832 P.2d 593 (Ariz. 1992) (the fact that 3,000 citizens marched 
and burned a trailer where defendant slept was admissible victim impact evidence in a court 
sentencing proceeding); Johnson v. Arkansas, 934 S.W.2d 179,189 (Ark. 1996) (argument to 
jury suggesting that it punish the defendant for taking away the victim's mother's "right" to 
watch her daughter grow up and marry); People v. Stanley, 897 P.2d 481, 523 (Cal. 1995) 
(argument inviting jurors to compare sympathy for defendant's family with sympathy for the 
victim's family was not improper); People v. Sandoval, 841 P.2d 862, 881 (Cal. 1992) 
(prosecution's argument requesting that the jury put the victim "in that casket" and put the 
victim's family "around it" was not improper); People v. Johnson, 842 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1992) (not 
improper for the prosecutor to refer to orphaned child or victim's desire for revenge); In re 
Petition, 597 A.2d 1 (Del. 1991) (trial court precluded from refusing to consider whether it 
would permit victim impact evidence, writ of mandamus issued to require trial court to abide 
by the state statute); Hornick v. Nevada, 825 P.2d 600 (Nev. 1992) (argument that defendant 
was responsible for the victim's child being without a mother was proper); Lucas v. Evatt, 
416 S.E.2d 646 (S.C. 1992) (closing argument by prosecutor referring to the victim's seven 
grandchildren was not fundamentally unfair under Payne). 
102. Appointed by President Bush on October 18, 1991; took office on October 23, 
1991. Justice Thomas has generally been unwilling to recognize the claims of capital 
defendants before the Supreme Court. For a survey of Justice Thomas' capital punishment 
jurisprudence, see Christopher E. Smith, The Constitution and Criminal Punishment: The 
Emerging Visions of Justices Scalia and Thomas, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 593 (1995) (discussing 
the conservative leanings of Justice Thomas in the area of the rights of criminal defendants in 
general and capital punishment in particular). 
103. Justice Blackmun retired in July 1993. 
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Before Justice Blackmun left the Court, however, he issued a scathing 
review of the fairness of capital punishment in Callins v. Collins .104 Justice 
Blackmun reasoned that capital punishment could not be fairly administered 
as it currently existed. 105 This view represented it departure from his earlier 
capital punishment jurisprudence. 106 Justice Blackmun's retirement from the 
Court left Justice John Paul Stevens as the only member of the Supreme 
Court who had voted for exclusion of victim impact testimony in capital jury 
cases. Even assuming that the newcomers to the Court, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg lO7 and Justice Stephen Breyer,IOS could be persuaded that Booth 
was correct in excluding victim impact evidence, the current composition of 
the Court leaves little doubt that a solid majority supporting the admission of 
victim impact evidence remains for the foreseeable future. 109 It would also 
104. 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun, 1., dissenting). This case was a dissent from a 
denial of a petition for writ of certiorari. 
105. Justice Blackmun stated: 
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more 
than 20 years I have endeavored-indeed, I have struggled-along with a majority of 
this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the 
mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to 
coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and 
the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply 
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to 
me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever can 
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic 
question-does the system accurately and consistently determine which defendants 
"deserve" to die?-cannot be answered in the affirmative. 
Id. at 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
106. Justice Blackmun endorsed capital punishment when he was initially appointed to 
the Supreme Court and was one of the original dissenters in Furman v. Georgia, 40S U.S. 23S 
(1972). He also endorsed as constitutional the 1976 trilogy of state capital punishment 
statutory schemes. See discussion of Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, and Jurek v. State, 
supra note 26. However, his comments in Callins v. Collins, 501 U.S. at 1141 reflect a 
dramatic departure from his earlier capital punishment position. For an excellent examination 
of Justice Blackmun's change of heart, see D. Grier Stephenson, Jr., Justice Blackmun's 
Eighth Amendment Pilgrimage, S B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 271 (1994) (describing Justice 
Blackmun's capital jurisprudence from his career on the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
until his retirement from the Supreme Court). Professor Stephenson remarked that "few 
justices in modem Supreme Court history have evidenced a more remarkable transformation 
in constitutional jurisprudence." /d. at 320. 
107. Appointed by President Clinton on August 3, 1993; took office on August 10, 
1993. 
lOS. Appointed by President Clinton on August 2, 1994; took office on September 30, 
1994. 
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appear unlikely that the Supreme Court would reverse itself twice on the 
same issue in the period of a relatively few years ,1 10 especially after having 
taken certiorari on the victim impact issue five times in the five years 
between 1986 and 1991.111 The Payne decision appears to have made the 
admissibility of victim impact information in capital jury sentencing, at least 
as a matter of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, secure. 
III. THE CASE FOR VICTIM IMPACT INFORMATION: THE ORIGIN AND 
ApPROV AL OF THE MODERN VICTIM P ARTICIPA TION ApPROACH 
Historically in Europe and England, prosecution of a criminal case had 
not always been a strictly public matter.112 However, the strain of the 
expense of investigating and conducting a private prosecution exacted a 
heavy financial burden on most victims, thus a system of public prosecution 
became necessary. That system, where criminal matters are brought in the 
name of the state rather than an individual citizen, has completely dominated 
American criminal law and its institutions .113 One trade-off that has resulted 
109. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter 
voted in the majority in Payne, 501 U.S. at 810. 
110. The Supreme Court has, on occasion, overruled a precedent soon after it was 
announced. An example of the Supreme Court overruling a recent precedent is in West 
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville Sch. 
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The Court in Barnette overruled Gobitis' 8-1 decision 
requiring that Jehovah's Witnesses salute the flag in public school. Some accounts of this 
overruling suggest that widespread violence against Jehovah's Witnesses by public officials 
and private citizens prompted the Court's change of heart since the Court's membership only 
changed by two Justices. PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICfIONS 15-35 (1988). 
See also Victor W. Rotnem & F.G. Folson, Jr., Recent Restrictions Upon Religious Liberty, 
36 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 1053 (1942). 
Ill. Not only was the victim impact issue addressed in Booth, Mills and Gathers, but 
in Payne v. Tennessee, 498 U.S. 1080 (1991), the Supreme Court requested the issue of 
overruling Booth be briefed although it had not been raised by either party. The Court also 
granted, then dismissed, another petition on the issue of overruling Booth, in State v. Huertas, 
553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990), cert. granted, 498 U.S. 957 (1990), and cert. dismissed as 
improvidently granted, 498 U.S. 336 (1991). 
112. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937 
(1985) (summarizing European and English experience evolving from a system of self help 
and family vengeance to a system of public prosecution). 
113. Phillip B. Kurland & D.W.M. Waters, Public Prosecutions in England 1854-79: 
An Essay in English Legislative History, 1959 DUKE LJ. 493, 512 (1959). 
"The 'criminal law' of Europe before the twelfth century was predominantly private. 
Public officers did not search out and investigate crimes. Injuries were brought to the 
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from the adoption of a public prosecution system has been marginalizing the 
role of individual victims of crime in the criminal justice process; that is, 
victims have been said to play only a "distinctly secondary role" in the 
criminal justice system. I 14 
One concern highlighting the shortcomings of the public prosecution 
system is the perception of unequal treatment of victims when compared to 
the advantages enjoyed by the criminally accused. Many resources are 
routinely committed to aid offenders who have already exacted a cost on 
society.115 The laws protecting the accused and the existence of 
constitutional protections for criminal defendants were ultimately compared 
to the relative absences of specific rights for victims of crime prior to the 
early 1980's by victims' rights advocates.116 The result of the tensions 
between liberal criminal procedure reforms 117 and more conservative victim-
focused concerns 118 contributed to the creation of the modem victims' rights 
attention of the officials of justice by those who had suffered them, and it was the accuser's 
responsibility to see that legal officers acted." EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 41 (1985). 
114. Abraham S. Goldstein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 
52 MISS. LJ. 515,519 (1982). 
115. See Henderson, supra note 112 (collecting examples of financial programs to 
rehabilitate offenders). 
116. See E. VAN ALLEN, OUR HANDCUFFED POLICE: THE ASSAULT UPON LAW AND 
ORDER IN AMERICA AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (1968). 
117. The Warren Court initiated a number of criminal procedure reforms beginning 
with the Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), principle of right to counsel. The 
activism of the Warren years on the Court has been described "as one of the most creative and 
daring periods in constitutional history." ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME 
COURT 337 (1972). During that period, the Court had "undertaken to supervise more closely 
than ever before our machinery of criminal law enforcement .... " /d. at 343. 
Key to those reforms was the implementation of the right to counsel in several stages of 
the criminal justice process. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel 
during police interrogation); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (right to counsel once 
adversary proceeding has begun); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. I (1970) (preliminary 
hearing is a critical stage requiring state to provide indigent counsel); Moore v. Illinois, 434 
U.S. 220 (1977) (in court identification at a preliminary hearing requires counsel to protect 
defendant's interest); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (pretrial post-indictment 
line-up requires counsel); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel when a 
defendant might be imprisoned for an offense); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to 
counsel applies to juveniles when they might be committed to a state institution); Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (if defendant has a first appeal as a matter of right under state 
law, he is entitled to counsel); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (right to counsel at 
probation revocation hearings). 
118. One writer has gone so far as to suggest that the Supreme Court put "a premium 
on lawlessness while it in effect penalizes the victim .... " E. V AN ALLEN, supra note 116, at 
119. 
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movement. The movement seeks to create specific rights to be enjoyed by 
victims in the criminal process, even if establishing such participation 
requires aggressive political action. Indeed, "[m]ost of the victim's rights 
activity has been far from dispassionate, and currently, the victims rights 
'movement' has a decidedly conservative bent."119 
The political activity of the victims' rights movement resulted in the 
commissioning of an influential report initiated by the Reagan 
Administration entitled the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime.120 
The report extensively addressed the concerns of victims of crime and 
proposed a host of solutions designed to promote equity in the criminal 
justice systems from the victim's point of view. Many of the report's 
recommendations also sought to remove substantive criminal process rights 
already established by the Supreme Court. Among those recommendations 
1 19. Henderson, supra note 112, at 951. 
120. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON VICTIMS OF CRIME FINAL REPORT (1982) 
(recommendations for governmental agencies). In a statement from Lois Haight Herrington, 
chairman of the Task Force, to President Ronald -Reagan, the goal and intentions of the 
committee to move the criminal justice systems toward greater recognition of victims was 
clearly explained: 
Dear Mr. President: 
When you established the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime on April 23, 
1982, you led the nation into a new era in the treatment of victims of crime. Never 
before has any President recognized the plight of those forgotten by the criminal 
justice system-the innocent victims of crime. 
In meeting the charge that you gave us, we reviewed the available literature on the 
subject of criminal victimization; we interviewed professionals, both in and out of the 
criminal justice system, who are responsible for serving victims; and, most 
importantly, we spoke with citizens from around the country whose lives have been 
altered by crime. 
We found that the perception you shared when you gave us our charge is, 
unfortunately, true. The innocent victims of crime have been overlooked, their pleas 
for justice have gone unheeded, and their wounds-personal, emotional, and 
financial-have gone unattended. 
We also found that there is no quick remedy to the innocent victim's plight. Only the 
sustained efforts of federal, state, and local governments, combined with the 
resources of the private sector, can restore balance to the criminal justice system. 
Citizens from all over the nation told us again and again how heartened they were 
that this Administration has taken up the challenge, ignored by others in the past, of 
stopping the mistreatment and neglect of the innocent by those who take liberty for 
license and by the system of justice itself. 
[d. at ii. 
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were suggestions to promote victim confidentiality,121 provide reasonable 
counseling for violent crime victims and their families,122 pennit hearsay at 
preliminary criminal hearings,123 reform the bail system,124 abolish the 
exclusionary rule, 125 provide notice for parole hearings, 126 abolish parole 
and judicial discretion at sentencing,127 increase criminal incident reporting 
requirements at schools,128 provide for increased reporting of arrest records 
of child abusers,129 require victim impact statements at sentencing,130 and 
121. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that addresses of victims 
and witnesses are not made public or available to the defense, absent a clear need as 
determined by the court." [d. at 17. 
122. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that designated victim 
counseling is legally privileged and not subject to defense discovery and subpoena." [d. 
123. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that hearsay is admissible 
and sufficient in preliminary hearings, so that victims need not testify in person." [d. 
[d. 
124. The Task Force recommended that: 
Legislation should be proposed and enacted to amend the bail laws to accomplish the 
following: 
a. Allow courts to deny bail to persons found by clear and convincing evidence to 
present a danger to the community; 
b. Give the prosecution the right to expedited appeal of adverse bail determinations, 
analogous to the right presently held by the defendant; 
c. Codify existing case law defining the authority of the court to detain defendants 
as to whom no conditions of release are adequate to ensure appearance at trial; 
d. Reverse, in the case of serious crimes, any standard that presumptively favors 
release of convicted persons awaiting sentence or appealing their convictions; 
e. Require defendants to refrain from criminal activity as a mandatory condition of 
release; and 
f. Provide penalties for failing to appear while released on bond or personal 
recognizance that are more closely proportionate to the penalties for the offense with 
which the defendant was originally charged. 
125. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to abolish the exclusionary rule as it 
applies to Fourth Amendment issues." [d. 
126. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to open parole release hearings to 
the public." [d. at 18. 
127. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to abolish parole and limit judicial 
discretion in sentencing." [d. 
[d. 
128. The Task Force suggested that: 
Legislation should be proposed and enacted to require that school officials report 
violent offenses against students or teachers, or the possession of weapons or 
narcotics on school grounds. The knowing failure to make such a report to the police, 
or deterring others from doing so, should be designated a misdemeanor. 
129. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to make available to businesses and 
organizations the sexual assault, child molestation, and pornography arrest records of 
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expand victim employee assistance 131 and financial assistance programs .132 
It is from this commission report and the movement supporting its adoption 
that the modem "victims rights" movement can be traced.133 
However, the recognition of the victims rights movement has not been 
exclusively legislative but also judicial. For example, the former Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court, Warren Burger, noted that "[i]n the 
administration of justice, courts may not ignore the concerns of victims."134 
Justice Anthony Kennedy, prior to his elevation to the Supreme Court, 
commented that steps to recognize the rights of victims are necessary "as a 
simple matter of distributive justice, a decent and compassionate society 
should recognize the plight of its victims and design its criminal system to 
alleviate their pain, not increase it."135 
prospective and present employees whose work will bring them in regular contact with 
children." Id. 
Id. 
130. Legislation should be proposed and enacted to accomplish the following: 
a. Require victim impact statements at sentencing; 
b. Provide for the protection of victims and witnesses from intimidation; 
c. Require restitution in all cases, unless the court provides specific reasons for 
failing to require it; 
d. Develop and implement guidelines for the fair treatment of crime victims and 
witnesses; and 
e. Prohibit a criminal from making any profit from the sale of the story of his crime. 
Any proceeds should be used to provide full restitution to his victims, pay the 
expenses of his prosecution, and finally, assist the crime victim compensation fund. 
131. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to establish or expand employee 
assistance programs for victims of crime employed by government." Id. 
132. "Legislation should be proposed and enacted to ensure that sexual assault victims 
are not required to assume the cost of physical examinations and materials used to obtain 
evidence." Id. 
133. For state and federal legislative action, the Task Force also proposed that the 
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution be amended to include the provision that: "the victim, 
in every criminal prosecution shall have the right to be present and to be heard at all critical 
stages of judicial proceedings." Id. at 114. 
In support of its amendment, the Task Force explained, that in its view "[t]he victims of 
crime have been transformed into a group oppressively burdened by a system designed to 
protect them. This oppression must be redressed .... [T]he fundamental rights of innocent 
citizens cannot adequately be perserved by any less decisive action.ld. at 114-15. See Carole 
Mansur, Payne v. Tennessee: The Effect of Victim Harm at Capital Sentencing Trials and the 
Resurgence of Victim Impact Statements, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 713,715-16 (1993). 
134. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,14 (1983). 
135. Anthony Kennedy, Address at the Sixth South Pacific Judicial Conference (Mar. 
3-5 1987), cited in George Nicholson, Victims' Rights, Remedies, and Resources: A Maturing 
Presence in America, 23 PAC. LJ. 828 (1992). 
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The movement has not only resulted in increased victim participation in 
criminal cases by encouraging states to adopt victim impact statements at 
sentencing,136 it has also spawned many recent successful state efforts to 
ratify victim based constitutional amendments.1 37 Even federal law provides 
136. Much of the political progress that was made during the early victims' rights 
movement began with organized victim groups, such as the National Organization of Victim 
Assistance (NOVA); additional groups, such as Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) and 
the Sunny von Bulow National Victim Advocacy Center, joined in the state by state 
legislative battle for greater victim participation in the criminal process. Paul G. Cassell, 
Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Cases for and the Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights 
Amendment, 1994 UTAHL. REV. 1373, 1382-83. 
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138. FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 32(b)(4). The federal provision for victim impact 
statements, as it appears in the amended version of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
32(b), reads as follows: 
(4) CONTENTS OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT. The presentence report must 
contain --
(A) information about the defendant's history and characteristics, including any 
prior criminal record, financial condition, and any circumstances that, because they 
affect the defendant's behavior, may be helpful in imposing sentence or in 
correctional treatment; 
(B) the classification of the offence and of the defendant under the categories 
established by the Sentencing Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a), as the 
probation officer believes to be applicable to the defendant's case; the kinds of 
sentence and the sentencing range suggested for such a category of defendant as set 
forth in the guidelines issued by the Sentencing Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 
994(a)(I); and the probation officer's explanation of any factors that may suggest a 
different sentence-within or without the applicable guideline-that would be more 
appropriate, given all the circumstances; 
(C) a reference to any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing 
Commission under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2); 
(D) verified information, stated in a nonargumentative style, containing an 
assessment of the financial, social, psychological, and medical impact on any 
individual against whom the offense has been committed. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32 (b)(4) 
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popular support for the death penalty has focused much attention on the 
participation of victims in capital punishment cases .139 
The recognition of victim participation in capital jury sentencing by the 
Supreme Court in Payne established in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
what was implicit in the criminal justice system for centuries. Payne clarified 
the position that the victims of a crime were entitled to see justice done 
separate and apart from the legitimate obligation of the community to seek 
punishment against the offender. 140 Prior to the existence of public 
prosecution, private methods of punishment were well established 
customs. 141 Indeed, simple vengeance as a goal of punishment has always 
had some measure of support. 142 In our contemporary justice system, the 
accommodation of private vengeance is more difficult to identify. Although, 
we no longer tum over the murderer to the surviving family members, the 
139. There is little doubt that most Americans support capital punishment in cases 
involving a murder conviction. A recent poll published by Newsweek magazine in July 1995 
reported that only 17% of those questioned opposed the death penalty in all cases. Of the 
remaining 83% of the population, 31 % believed that persons convicted of murder in the 
course of violent crime and major drug dealing should be executed; 28% of those surveyed 
indicated that those convicted of brutal murder, mass murder and serial killings should be 
subject to the death penalty. Tom Morganthau, Condemned to Life, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 7,1995, 
at 19. 
In 1969, the approval rate for capital punishment was 51 %. Hazel Erskine, The Polls: 
Capital Punishment, 34 PuB. OPINIONQ. 290, 291 (1970). A national Harris poll conducted in 
1973 showed that 59% supported the penalty. Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., The Harris 
Survey, New York, New York, June II and 14, 1973, CHIC. ThIB. (1973). 
140. Ken Eikenberry, The Elevation of Victims' Rights in Washington State: 
Constitutional Status, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 19 (1989) (arguing that the "pendulum" is swinging 
back in favor of victims). 
141. One writer believes that our contemporary legal system has removed individual 
justice through vengeance from the criminal process. She writes, "[o]n an individual basis, the 
vendetta and feud have been outlawed. They are deemed atavistic relics of more barbarous 
ages: men and women are supposed to refrain from taking vengeance on their enemies no 
matter what the provocation and instead tum to the law for justice and satisfaction." LOIS G. 
FORER, A RAGE TO PuNISH 97 (1994). Forer's observation does not, however, conform to the 
current desire of victims to participate. If the only way a victim may express their desire for 
revenge is within the courthouse walls, then victim impact information becomes the only 
alternative to private vengeance if a victim is to be heard individually at all. For many 
victims, a response from the prosecutor, acting as a representative of the people, is woefully 
inadequate to satisfy their sense of justice. 
142. It has been said that the public demand for the death penalty, as public vengeance 
or retribution, has gained new respectability. William P. Barr, U.S. Attorney General under 
the Bush Administration, declared that a deserved execution creates "a moral satisfaction in 
the community, and I think that's justified." [d. at 10 1. 
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victim's concern for personal vengeance is not totally ignored in our public 
prosecution system. 
Indeed, victim participation as a vehicle for recognition of private 
vengeance in the system is well illustrated by a statement adopted as part of 
the victim's task force report.143 
Although the means by which private vengeance is taken into account by 
the use of victim impact information may be subtle, the objective is clear. 
The goal is to enhance the punishment of the offender. l44 Even if that 
punishment is the ultimate sanction of death.145 The legal, social and moral 
forces of the vengeance driven, victim participation model of imposing 
punishment cannot be ignored. 
Proponents of a victim participation model have advanced many 
compelling arguments. Many of those arguments were identified throughout 
the opinions of the Justices joining the majority in Payne. 146 Legal and 
historical considerations alone, however, only tell part of the story of the 
victims right movement. Emotional considerations and recognition of the 
victim's personal suffering play a major role in understanding why the 
victims rights movement demands the need for direct victim participation. 
One commentator has noted that the victims rights movement attempts to 
respect 
,/d. 
143. TASK FORCE FINAL REPORT, supra note 120, at 78. 
The goal of victim participation is not to pressure justice, but to aid in its attainment. 
The judge cannot take a balanced view if his information is acquired from only one 
side. The prosecutor can begin to present the other side, but he was not personally 
affected by the crime or its aftermath, and may not be fully aware of the price the 
victim has paid. It is as unfair to require that the victim depend solely on the 
intercession of the prosecutor as it would be to require that the defendant rely solely 
on his counsel. 
144. A principal justification for capital punishment has been to impose retribution for 
the criminal act. Retribution and vengeance are closely linked with vengeance being more 
personal to the victims. One of my colleagues has written, "[r]etribution, or just deserts, seeks 
to punish an offender for the act committed commensurate with the harm inflicted and the 
moral wrongfulness of the act. Retribution i,s retrospective in that it punishes for what was 
done without any regard to possible future benefits arising out of the punishment." Steven 
Grossman, Proportionality in Non-Capital Sentencing: The Supreme Court's Tortured 
Approach to Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 84 Ky. LJ. 107, 162-63 (footnotes omitted) 
(1995-96). It is often difficult to tell whether victims or victims' groups advocate retribution, 
vengeance, or both. 
145. See supra notes 141-42. 
146. See supra notes 54-90. 
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subjective experiences and feelings of victims and for their need to tell their 
own stories. There is also a calculated judgment that the sentencer who hears 
from the victim or the victim's family will find the victims suffering more 
reason to hold the defendant responsible and thus will sentence more 
stringently,147 
Some have gone so far as to suggest that the victim impact statement 
marks the resurgence of vengeance by victims and families through the 
criminal justice system since direct victim participation in the courtroom 
provides an alternative to vigilante justice.148 
All victim participation, however, is not motivated by vengeance. Two 
compelling reasons unrelated to retribution are frequently advanced by 
victims groups. First, that participation in the process helps the victim regain 
a sense of control over their lives. 149 This "self help therapy" is a favorable 
alternative to simply feeling vulnerable and devastated by the effect of the 
criminal act on one's life. Second, victim participation is said to enhance the 
efficiency of the criminal justice system through increased victim 
participation and thus encourages future involvement of victims in' solving 
crime. 150 
Notwithstanding the concerns for more balance in the system and the 
therapeutic value of victim participation, it is difficult to separate the 
147. Martha Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1416 (1993). 
148. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Victimhood, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 
92-93 (1992). All do not agree that victim participation has a healing or therapeutic effect. 
"Vengeance and anger are intertwined, and while victims' anger at the criminal who 
victimized them is justifiable, vengeance as a manifestation of that anger has a questionable 
psychological value to the victim." Michael I. Oberlander, Note, The Payne of Allowing 
Victim Impact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 V AND. L. REV. 1621, 1653 
(1992). See also Henderson, supra note 112, at 994-95. 
149. Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 501, 
504 (1986); Oberlander, supra note 148, at 1624-25. 
Roberta Roper, one of the nation's leading victims rights advocates, has noted that 
"[wJhen you become a crime victim, all the controls in your life are gone. But letting victims 
make choices returns some of the control." Patrick McGuire, Fighting for the Rights Cause, 
BALTIMORE SUN, February 28,1994, at DI, D2. 
150. McLeod, supra note 149, at 506. The routine disregard for victims and witnesses 
in the process, even scheduling matters, has unfortunate consequences. For example, a first-
year law student in my class who was a crime victim requested two excused absences because 
she was summoned as a witness in a criminal case. She was frustrated by the prosecutor's last 
minute contact and numerous changes in the court date. After her experience in that case, she 
said that the lack of efficiency in the system would make her reluctant to participate in the 
future. 
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demands for increased victim participation from the desire for proportional 
retributive punishment. All else being equal, many still embrace the view 
that punishment should be proportionally allocated according to the harm 
inflicted by the wrongdoer. 151 A logical extension of allocating adequate 
punishment in comparison to the harm caused by an offender supports the 
conclusion that in cases of capital murder the surviving victim's desire for 
the defendant to be executed must be considered. To do otherwise would 
jeopardize the public prosecution system's effort to retain its legitimate place 
in our law enforcement scheme. Thus, it has been said that "capital 
punishment for murder exerts a moral influence by indicating that life is the 
most highly protected value."152 It would seem that if it is legitimate that a 
death penalty exists at all,153 it should be the legally recognized substitute 
for private vengeance. That is, victim impact should be considered as part of 
a system of public punishment which is an adequate substitute for citizens 
taking matters of punishment into their own hands .154 
Proponents of capital punishment fervently contend that "society has not 
only the right, but the affirmative duty, to enact the supreme penalty from 
foul and vicious killers."155 The public has a desire to see severe punishment 
for serious crimes. This phenomena is referred to by one observer as "the 
boundless outrage that generates demands for boundless retribution."156 
151. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 34 (1987). 
152. Johannes Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. 
L. REV. 949,967 (1966). 
153. For arguments citing reasons for opposition to capital punishment, see infra notes 
287-92. 
154. Even opponents of capital punishment can understand and sympathize with the 
pain that causes many loved ones of murder victims to call for the death of the killer. 
In some ancient societies, it was left to the families of the dead person to exact a 
price for the wrong that had been done to them-whether that price was an economic 
penalty or "a life for a life." Punishment by the state is, in an essential way, a 
substitute for personal vengeance. It was meant not only to replace it, but to 
supersede it. 
MICHAEL KRONENWETIER, CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 34 (1993). 
155. FRANK G. CARRINGTON, NEITHER CRUEL NOR UNUSUAL 18 (1978). Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once commented that, "[i]f people would gratify the passion of revenge 
outside of the law, if law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy the craving 
itself .... " OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (Little, Brown & Co. 1963) 
(1881). 
156. SUSAN JACOBY, WILD JUSTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF REVENGE 289 (1993). 
402 RUTGERS LA W JOURNAL [Vol. 28:367 
Even without conclusive evidence that capital punishment deters 
crime,157 many people desire that it remain an option. Some citizens believe 
that the penalty is at least necessary to establish that some behavior is 
intolerable. Without the penalty, it has been argued that victims will lose 
confidence that someone will "act on their behalf .... "158 The criminal 
justice system could lose its power as the only legitimate authority to enforce 
the law. For example, one writer fears that "[aJ society that is unable to 
convince individuals of its ability to enact atonement for injury is a society 
that runs a constant risk of having its members revert to wilder forms of 
justice." 159 
With violent crime on the rise, most people are unlikely to stop 
pressuring the justice system to punish offenders severely or execute them 
when it seems appropriate. In such a climate it is certainly naive to suggest 
that victims of homicide or other violent crimes would desire, for the sake of 
the criminally accused, to abandon their participation in the sentencing 
process. 
As one commentator has observed, 
[t]he average citizen is not minded to become a killer; nor does he lose much 
sleep over the possibility of being falsely accused of murder, such situations 
being rare. What he is worried about is becoming a victim. As crime has 
proliferated in this country, the average citizen has watched the statistical 
chances of becoming the victim of violent crime grow drastically, and he 
does not like it.160 
As crime has increased it is not illogical to believe that the trend for a 
more active role of the victims will increase. Political pressure on judges, 
prosecutors and other elected officials to recognize the need for victims to 
participate in punishing the offender will continue to have a profound effect 
on all aspects of the criminal justice system. 
157. Whether the death penalty has a deterrent effect has lead to considerable debate. 
See, e.g., Isaac Erhlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life or 
Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975) (arguing the deterrent effect of capital punishment). 
But see WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 137-47 (1974) (arguing the absence of 
deterrence and criticizing Erhlich's reSUlts). 
158. JACOBY, supra note 156) at 5. 
159. Jd. at 10. 
160. CARRINGTON, supra note 155, at 20. 
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IV. A CRITIQUE OF PAYNE AND THE PROBLEMS IT PRESENTS 
Despite the compelling case that can be made for victim participation 
and the obvious political muscle which supports initiatives to increase and 
protect victim participation, the Payne decision presents several challenges 
that cannot be ignored by the courts for very long. The Supreme Court's 
decision in Payne has opened the door to victim participation in capital jury 
sentencing and has not placed many tangible limits on that participation. 
Payne has made it clear that the impact on the victim's family in a homicide 
case may be considered by a sentencing jury on the theory that it is simply 
relevant to evaluating the appropriate punishment.161 As a practical matter 
its general relevance and admissibility is, for the most part, a closed legal 
question. 162 Other than a possible Due Process challenge to some potential, 
but as of yet, unspecified inflammatory use of victim impact information l63 
and a conspicuous silence on whether a victim could actually recommend a· 
sentence of death to the jury,l64 the Payne opinion places few limitations on 
what a victim may say. Furthermore, the question of who qualifies as a 
"victim" presents problems of its own. 165 For example, should the testimony 
be limited to immediate family or, in absence of a statute, could anyone 
acquainted with the victim be able to offer testimony about how the crime 
and the loss of the victim has affected their life?166 
161. See supra notes 79-82. 
162. See supra note Ill. 
163. See Jonathan H. Levy, Note, Limiting Victim Impact Evidence and Argument 
After Payne v. Tennessee, 45 STAN. L. REV. \027 (1993). 
164. See State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1995) (recommendation of sentence by 
surviving victim can be improper, but was harmless in this case). 
165. The Supreme Court opinions on victim impact statements are virtually silent on 
the scope of those persons who would qualify as appropriate surviving victims. Katie Long, 
Community Imput at Sentencing: Victim's Rights, Victim's Revenge, 75 B.UL REV. 187 
(1995). Payne v. Tennessee does not suggest it should be limited to family members. /d. at 
199. One commentator has argued that Payne supports the proposition that community impact 
testimony will become a fixture in the criminal justice process. Id. at 229. Such an approach 
would involve testimony of a community representative at the sentencing hearing describing 
the loss of the victim to the sentencer in terms of loss to the community. Id. at 195-96. 
166. One court recently interpreting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987), 
described the potential range of victim impact testimony very broadly. See Nooner v. State, 
907 S.W.2d 677 (Ark. 1995) ("[T]estimony may range from the victim's family to those close 
to that person who were profoundly impacted by his death .... "). However, the trial judge in 
the celebrated death penalty case of Susan Smith refused to permit a police officer to testify 
about the emotional impact they experienced when recovering the bodies of her dead children 
from the water and the impact on people who were around at the time. State v. Smith, No. 94-
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It could be argued that everyone in the community is affected by the 
death of one of its members. Does the language of Payne support the notion 
that co-workers and close friends would be able to offer their reflections on 
the decency of the victim and how his or her loss will affect the workplace or 
the community? And if such reflections are allowed, and surviving victims 
can presumably influence the decision of a jury to impose death, then what 
. result for the person murdered without surviving victims able to offer victim 
impact? Does absence of spokespersons result in a lesser influence in the 
criminal justice system?167 One comment has suggested that such a ranking 
of victims is a violation of equal protection of the law.168 
Arguably, if the victim's value to society is truly relevant in sentencing 
capital defendants, there would be no reason why a prosecutor could not 
survey all people who knew the victim to obtain the most accurate 
information on the kind of person the victim was and how valuable the 
community believed him or her to be.169 Such cases have yet to come before 
the Supreme Court but it is likely that a broader definition of victim impact 
information might be pursued by a prosecutor if a victim was particularly 
renowned. For example, if a doctor who discovered a cure for AIDS was 
murdered, the value of his contribution to society certainly adds to the 
impact of the crime on people beyond his immediate family. Taking the 
point a step further, what if a researcher was murdered just before she was 
able to complete the final step in the cure for cancer? Could it not be said 
65-44-906 and 94-65-44-907, 1995 WL 702707, at *8 (S.C. Ct. Gen. Sess. Tr. July 26, 
1995». The South Carolina jury ultimately refused to render a death sentence. Morganthau, 
supra note 139. 
167. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506. 
168. See Jonathan Willmott, Comment, Victim Characteristics and Equal Protection 
for the Lives of All: An Alternative Analysis of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina v. 
Gathers and a Proposed Standard for the Admission of Victim Characteristics in Sentencing, 
56 BROOK. L. REV. 1045 (1990). 
169. The majority in Booth feared valuing and comparing one life over another. See 
supra note 29. Some commentators argue that since such comparisons are inevitable, 
mathematic formulas should be devised to accomplish the task. See Teree E. Foster, Beyond 
Victim Impact Evidence: A Modest Proposal, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 1305, 1312 (1994) (arguing 
for use of calibrated scales assigning point value to the loss felt by victim to determine victim 
level of participation in the punishment, and also suggesting the notion that "all persons have 
equal worth is irrational and unrealistic .... "; see also David D. Friedman, Should the 
Characteristics of Victims and Criminals Count?: Payne v. Tennessee and Two Views of 
Efficient Punishment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 731 (1993) (developing a formula of "low value" and 
"high value" victims in order to establish appropriate punishment for a particular killing). 
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that all persons who may have benefited from her near completed work are 
victims who have suffered loss from her death?170 
The problem of making victim impact information relevant to capital 
sentencing is that it potentially opens the "Pandora's box" of possibilities for 
a prosecutor seeking a death sentence. How far can the prosecution push to 
establish the good character of the victim? Can he submit work performance 
evaluations, recorded testimonials, funeral eulogies, or even a high school 
report card, in an effort to demonstrate the loss to the family and the 
community? May the victim's yearbooks, family photo albums or concert 
performance tapes be submitted as well? If such material is not prohibited in 
a capital sentencing proceeding, under Payne, absent specific statutory 
prohibitions, what legal principle prevents such information from being 
considered? 171 
Whatever the legitimate criticism of the Booth exclusion of victim 
impact evidence may be, the decision at least had the advantage of offering a 
bright line approach to the appropriate treatment of such information .172 
Booth clearly mandated that the admission of such information in a capital 
casel73 was reversible constitutional error. The rule in Booth made it clear all 
efforts to have the jury overtly consider the worth of individual defendants or 
170. See Long, supra note 165, at 207-08 (arguing for the variety of ways to view the 
community as victim). 
171. In Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 250 (Md. 1995), a ninety-second piano 
performance videotape of the victim was played to the jury during the sentencing phase. 
Jamie Griffin, the victim, was a gifted piano player and the videotape was held not cumulative 
even though his parents testified about his piano playing ability.ld. at 250-51. Another court 
held that there was nothing improper about a prosecutor's argument suggesting what parents 
and friends "might" have said about the victim. State v. Gregory, 459 S.E.2d 638, 673-74 
(N .C. 1995). See also Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 1995) (an officer testifying about 
the death of a fellow officer and its effect on children in the community was improper, but 
harmless); State v. Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326 (La. 1995) (prosecutor's argument that he could 
have called "dozens" of victim impact witnesses held not reversible error). 
172. The Supreme Court has, in other contexts, announced "bright line" rules to avoid 
uncertainty. In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), the Court issued a "bright line" 
rule that permitted police to order the driver out of the car even without the officer needing 
reasonable suspicion to do so. The policy advanced for such a rule was that police should not 
need to guess about when they could make such a request since serious issues of safety arise 
in vehicle stops. Such rules add stability to the law and generally lead to uniform conduct. 
See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (if police obtain a warrant, searches will 
be upheld even if the facts in the warrant do not constitute probable cause). 
173. Courts would sometimes avoid the consequences of Booth by holding that the 
victim impact evidence was harmless. See, e.g., State v. Paz, 798 P.2d I, 15-17 (Idaho 1990), 
cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259 (1991). 
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victims would be highly suspect. This reduced the risk that a death sentence 
would be rendered because of the victim rather than the background of the 
offender or the crime.174 The consequence of permitting victim impact 
information is the risk that the victim and consequences of the crime might 
dominate the jury's consideration of a death sentence .175 Sentencing 
hearings might ultimately evolve into presentations of "the worth of the 
victim," that would resemble those issues that sometimes arise in tort 
litigation.176 Indeed, if the Constitution presents no impediment to the use of 
victim impact information other than the due process clause, and if such 
information is considered generally relevant as Payne suggests, than there 
would be no reason that a legislative body could not only permit, but require 
greater victim participation than is presently recognized in most states .177 
174. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983). 
175. See Elizabeth Anna Meek, Comment, Victim Impact Evidence and Capital 
Sentencing: A Casenote on Payne v. Tennessee, 52 LA. L. REV. 1299, 1310 (1992) ("Even if 
it was relevant in a particular case, by its nature, [victim impact] evidence is unduly 
prejudicial."). 
176. Valuing life and loss of enjoyment is not only common in tort litigation but in 
some cases necessary for recovery of damages. In federal law, recovery for loss of the 
pleasure of living is actionable under § 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. An 
English court required damages be allowed for the "loss of expectation of life." See Rose v. 
Ford, [1937] A.C. 826,836. Recently, the Supreme Court unanimously held that damages for 
"loss of the enjoyment of life" were allowable compensation under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act. Molzof v. United States, 499 U.S. 918 (1992). Such valuation of life has come to be 
known as "Hedonic Damages." See Anderson v. Nebraska Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 538 N.W.2d 
732,739 (Neb. 1995) (hedonic damages are those damages awarded for loss of enjoyment of 
life, and are measured separate from economic productive value that an injured person would 
have had); Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), affd, 827 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 
. 1987) (testimony of expert held admissible to assist jury in "determining the most accurate 
and probable estimate of ... the hedonic value of [decedent's] life"). Some jurisdictions have 
developed doctrine which permits recovery on the direct valuation on this type of loss. See, 
e.g., Rufino v. United States, 829 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1987) (comatose plaintiff without 
cognitive awareness to recover for the "loss of enjoyment of life as separately compensable 
items of damages"). See also Patrick B. Murray, Hedonic Damages: Properly a Factor Within 
Pain and Suffering Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 37 (1989) (arguing the 
continuing validity of Sherrod concerning hedonic damages). Arguably, these doctrines 
already provides a legally adequate basis to introduce specific evidence of the value of the 
victim's life and the loss of the enjoyment of that life to the surviving victim and his family, 
especially in light of Payne's holding that the victim's loss is relevant to sentencing and 
legislative willingness to permit more victim participation. But see Wilt v. Buracker, 443 
S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994) (testimony of expert regarding 
hedonic damages not permitted); Southlake Limousine & Coach, Inc. v. Brock, 578 N.E.2d 
677 (Ind. App. 1991) (rejecting recovery of hedonic damages). 
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How far individual states will broaden the victim participation remains to be 
seen. A state may place limits on those eligible to participate in capital 
sentencing proceedings, but reforms that would limit victim participation are 
unlikely to garner much political support. 178 
The problem, however, only begins with determining the categories of 
victims eligible to participate. It is still unclear what victims can tell the jury 
about the deceased,179 how much detail the survivors can use to describe the 
177. In fact, political support for victim's rights reform come from victim's rights 
advocates who have succeeded in passing some form of victim impact legislation in 49 
jurisdictions, permitting victim participation in both capital and noncapital contexts. See 
Carrie L. MUlholland, Note, Sentencing Criminals: The Constitutionality of Victim Impact 
Statements, 60 Mo. L. REV. 731 n.74 (1995) (collecting victim impact statement statutes 
currently in effect). 
In April, 1996, a victim's Bill of Rights constitutional Amendment was introduced to 
Congress which would provide as follows: 
Victims' Rights Constitutional Amendment 
Section I. To ensure that the victim is treated with fairness, dignity, and respect, 
from the occurrence of crime of violence and other crimes as may defined by law 
pursuant to section two of this article, and throughout the criminal, military, and 
juvenile justice processes, as a matter fundamental rights to liberty, justice. and due 
process, the victim shall have the following rights: to be informed of and given the 
opportunity to be present at every proceeding in which those rights are extended to 
the accused or convicted offender; to be heard at any previously negotiated plea, or a 
release from custody; to be informed of any release or escape; and to a speedy trial, a 
final conclusion free from unreasonable delay, full restitution from the convicted 
offender, reasonable measures to protect the victim from violence or intimidation by 
the accused or convicted offender, and notice of the victim's rights. 
Section 2. The several States, with respect to a proceeding in a State forum, and 
the Congress with respect to a proceeding in a United States forum, shall have the 
power to implement further the rights established in this article by appropriate 
legislation. 
142 CONGo REC. S3795 (daily ed. April 22,1995) (statement of Senator Kyl). 
178. One victim impact statute authorizes that "a victim who is incapacitated or 
otherwise incompetent shall be represented by a parent or present legal guardian, or if none 
exists, by a representative designated by the prosecuting attorney without court appointment 
.... " WASH. REV. CODE § 7.69.040. Under the same statute, a survivor is defined as a 
"spouse, child, parent, legal guardian, sibling or grandparent." /d. § 7.69.020. 
179. Payne gives no guidance on what a victim may say, but implicit in its overruling 
Booth is the suggestion by the Supreme Court that the extensive victim impact testimony 
given in Booth might be constitutionally permissible. See Booth, 482 U.S. 496, 509-515 
(1987). 
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effect of their 10ss,ISO and how the defendant can rebut such evidence in a 
capital jury sentencing. 
V. VICTIM IMPACT AND CONFRONTATION: THE BATTLE NOT WORTH 
WINNING 
There is no question that a capital defendant has the right to attack the 
accuracy of information that is offered against him at his sentencing 
hearing .ISI 
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided Gardner v. Florida,182 which 
recognized the right to due process and confrontation in capital sentencing 
proceedings.IS3 In Gardner, the Supreme Court overturned a capital sentence 
because the basis of a pre-sentence report was not made available to the 
defendant in the time for him to rebut.184 The plurality opinion reasoned that 
imposing a death sentence "on the basis of information which [the defendant] 
had no opportunity to deny or explain," violated due process. IS5 In the years 
following Gardner, the Supreme Court decided several cases which 
reaffirmed that principal. In Ake v. Oklahoma,IS6 the Court held that where 
the state intends to present psychiatric evidence in a capital sentencing 
proceeding the indigent defendant was entitled to the assistance of a 
psychiatrist for his defense in order to provide him "a meaningful 
opportunity to present a complete defense."IS7 Most recently, the Supreme 
Court in Simmons v. South Carolina,188 held that a capital defendant was 
entitled to a jury instruction explaining the availability of the sentencing 
180. An example of one statute that provides a broad scope of potential victim impact 
information permits "the victim or a survivor, individually or with the assistance of the 
prosecuting attorney ... [to include] but is not limited to information assessing the financial, 
medical, social, and psychological impact of the offense . . . ." WASH. REV. CODE § 
7.69.020(4). 
181. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (l94S) (under the Due Process Clause an 
offender has the right to attack information at his sentencing that is inaccurate). The American 
Law Institute's Model Penal Code Section on Capital Punishment, while not endorsing capital 
punishment, suggested that any capital statute provide that the defendant's counsel be 
accorded a fair opportunity to rebut evidence offered by the prosecution at a death penalty 
sentencing proceeding. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1985). 
IS2. 430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
183. [d. at 350-51. 
184. [d. at 353. 
185. [d. at 362. 
186. 470 U.S. 68 (l9S5). 
187. [d. at 83-87. 
18S. 512 U.S. 154 (1994). 
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alternative of life without the possibility of parole, in order to rebut the 
State's suggestions that the defendant would be a danger in the future. 
Embracing Gardner, the Court's opinion reasoned that "the Due Process 
Clause does not allow the execution of a person on the basis of information 
which he had no opportunity to deny or explain." I 89 
Of course, one of the principle vehicles to challenge evidence presented 
by the state is the right to confrontation through cross-examination 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.190 The right to cross-examination, 
described as "an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair 
trial which is this country's constitutional goal,"191 was been made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.192 Accordingly, 
the constitutional jurisprudence suggests that a capital defendant has a right 
to attempt to confront victim impact information at a capital sentencing 
proceeding .193 
The right to confront does not, however, necessarily support the wisdom 
of such a strategy. Indeed, one might accurately describe the enterprise of 
attempting to attack the grief of a surviving victim or the background of a 
deceased victim as a classic example of "Hobson's Choice."194 The law may 
provide the basis to challenge the victims, but in most cases, a defense 
attorney has no true choice but to accept what has been offered. Confronting 
victims by cross-examination might anger the sentencing jury .195 
189. [d. at 159 (citing Gardner, 430 U.S. at 349). 
190. As it relates to confrontation, the Sixth Amendment provides "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... be informed of the nature and cause of 
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " U.s. CONST. amend. VI. 
191. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (1965). 
192. /d. at 406. 
193. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,318 (1974) (cross-examination is 
available to demonstrate bias and reliability of a witness and is a fundamental right). 
194. The phrase "Hobson's Choice" originates from the writings of the English poet 
and historian John Milton (1608-74). The expression refers to Thomas Hobson, a Cambridge 
carrier and liveryman who had a "custom of letting out his horses in rotation, and not 
allowing his customers to choose among them." THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH 
LITERATURE 465 (Margaret Drabble ed.) (5th ed. 1985). 
195. In the context of victim impact information the opportunity to challenge the 
character of the deceased or the impact of the crime on the victim in all but the most unusual 
circumstances meets the traditional definition of Hobson's Choice. See supra note 194. That 
is: "an apparent freedom to take or reject something offered when in actual fact no such 
freedom exists: an apparent freedom of choice where there is no real alternative: the forced 
acceptance of something whether one likes it or not .... " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1076 (unabridged. ed. 1966). 
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The Booth Court addressed the issue of confrontation in its ill-fated 
decision when it observed that "the defendant would have the right to cross-
examin[ation] ... but he rarely would be able to show that the family 
members have exaggerated the degree of sleeplessness, depression, or 
emotional trauma suffered."196 The Court also noted that an attack on the 
deceased's character was equally unappealing.I 97 
Consider an example of the problems of confronting victim impact 
testimony that arose in the case of Lodowski v. State.I 98 Lodowski, a 
Maryland death penalty case that proceeded Booth in addressing the issue of 
victim impact, involved the robbery and murder of two men at a suburban 
Washington D.C. mini mart.I 99 One of the victims was Minh Huong 
Phamdo. Several witnesses offered victim impact statements including 
Minh's 74-year-old grandmother.200 In describing her loss in religious terms· 
the victim impact statement expressed her belief "that when she passed away 
her soul would wander aimlessly for her fIrst grandson [Minh] is not on earth 
to worship her. Any other grandson who would take over the duty of 
ancestor wor[s]hipping would not be as effective as Minh, the fIrst bom."201 
Although the Court of Appeals reversed the death sentence on other 
grounds202 it analyzed the legislative intent in permitting the consideration 
of victim impact evidence.203 In dicta intended to guide the lower court on 
remand at resentencing the Court of Appeals said, "[w]e see no constitutional 
impediment to the legislature's determination that victim impact statements 
are relevant in a capital sentencing proceeding, and we bow to the legislative 
judgment that such statements are relevant."204 However, in an opinion that 
concurred in the judgment, but disagreed with the victim impact dicta, Judge 
Harry A. Cole pointed out the confrontation dilemma When he queried: 
"How can [the defendant] challenge any testimony that expresses 
bereavement, religious harm, or infant sorrow? The defendant must remain 
mute while the victim's family pleads for its 'pound of flesh.' "205 
196. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506. 
197. [d. at 507. 
198. 490 A.2d 1228 (Md. 1985). 
199. [d. at 1231. 
200. [d. at 1269 (Cole, J., concurring). 
201. /d. 
202. The court remanded for a new sentencing hearing based upon the trial court's 
improper denial of a motion to suppress Lodowski's statement. [d. at 1258. 
203. [d. at 1252-1257. 
204. [d. at 1253. 
205. [d. at 1277 (Cole,J., concurring). 
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The problem posed by the Judge Cole in Lodowski is sobering. There is 
virtually no way for the defendant to attack the claims of family members 
who assert their measure of emotional pain and surely no way to examine the 
validity of the effect on one's afterlife.206 For a defense lawyer representing 
the capital defendant, questioning a grieving family member on either matter 
would be suicide in most cases. 
One commentator has suggested that if approached with caution, the 
defense may consider contacting the family of the deceased in an effort to 
mitigate victim impact evidence.207 Professor Randall Coyne argues: 
Although a matter of extreme delicacy, the defense should consider 
attempting to establish contact with the victim's family. The funeral director 
may be able either to identify an approachable family spokesperson or to 
establish contact with a priest, minister, or rabbi assisting the family during 
their tragedy. Although the family's initial reaction may be to avoid any 
contact with the defense attorneys, one should not automatically assume that 
all family members will seek to have the client killed.208 
There are at least four problems with such an approach. First, as 
Professor Coyne recognizes, the victim's opinion, that death is not an 
appropriate sentence for the defendant, may not even be admissible.209 
Second, it is virtually impossible to cross-examine a bereaved victim. 
How does one go about questioning a victim on matters regarding the extent 
of the grief and suffering without generating more sympathy for the victims? 
The result would be to move ones' client closer to execution. Even though it 
may be difficult for a victim to substantiate early morning stomach aches and 
late night tears, what defense attorney would dare attempt to establish the 
inaccuracy of such claims on cross-examination? Only in a case where the 
206. See supra note 202. 
207. Randall Coyne, Inflicting Payne on Oklahoma: The Use of Victim Impact 
Evidence During the Sentencing Phase of Capital Cases, 45 OKLA. L. REV. 589 (1992). 
208. [d. at 613. 
209. Professor Coyne notes that Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1987), 
found inadmissible testimony of one of the victim's relatives' that she did not believe in the 
death penalty. See Coyne, supra note 207, at 618-19, 622. Other courts have agreed with this 
conclusion. See State v. Pirtle, 904 P.2d 245 (Wash. 1995) (a victim's testimony in opposition 
to the death penalty is not mitigating, nor is it victim impact testimony, rather it is an 
inappropriate recommendation of sentence). 
412 RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:367 
victim is hopelessly unworthy of sympathy could such an effort even be 
contemplated.210 
Third, most victims are likely to be irritated by defense efforts to contact 
them. Obviously, the obligation of the attorney to represent the capital 
defendant places the loyalty of the attorney at odds with the victim's desire 
for the defendant to be punished.211 The victim will no doubt understand the 
attorney's role and may refuse to cooperate and at worst, the victim may well 
become hostile and be more likely to demand more severe punishment. At 
least one study has suggested this possibility.212 
A final problem generated by attempts to contact the victim is the very 
real risk that the defense lawyers will become part of the victim impact 
against their own client. It is certainly not unreasonable to suggest that a 
victim might become upset about the attempt of a defense attorney or his 
representatives to contact the victim through a funeral director or a 
clergyman as has been suggested by Professor Coyne? 13 The attorney's well 
intentioned effort to diligently prepare his case may result in an embarrassing 
mention of his efforts to contact the family by a victim in the victim impact 
statement. Surely, attempts to approach the victim will, in most cases, place 
an attorney representing a capital client between Scylla and Charybdis.214 
Even more troubling is Professor Coyne's suggestion that victim impact 
should be confronted by a direct comparison of the victim's life to that of the 
defendant. He asserts: "Rebutting victim impact evidence requires a 
210. See Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye for an Eye and Then Some, 25 CONN. L. REV. 
205, 255 (1992) ("At capital sentencing, the jury has already convicted the offender of 
murdering the victim. By attempting to impeach the testimony relating to the victim or 
impugn the victim's character, the offender will only incense the jury."). 
211. Obviously an attorney's obligation to his client must supersede all other concerns 
that an attorney may have for the victim of the crime. "Undivided allegiance and faithful, 
devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this kind of 
service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision." Von Moltke v. Gillie, 332 U.S. 
708,725-26 (1948) (footnotes omitted). 
212. See John Hagan, Victims Before the Law: A Study of Victim Involvement in the 
Criminal Justice Process, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 317, 328 (1982) ("It may be that in 
the process of attempting to prove the client's innocence the defense counsel aggravates 
tensions between the victims and accused."). 
213. See supra note 208. 
214. In Greek mythology, two immortal monsters who tormented Greek mariners, 
particularly the mythical character Odysseus. See HOMER, THE ILIAD AND THE ODYSSEY 
(Samuel Butler trans., & Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952). The monsters were said to be 
positioned close to each other in the Straits of Messina in the Western Mediterranean making 
it difficult to navigate a vessel between them. The monsters give poetic expression to the 
dangers one faces when going into uncharted waters in an effort to rebut victim impact. 
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thorough investigation of the background and life of the victim. If faced with 
overwhelming evidence that the deceased had a loving family, the defense 
attorney should compare her client's life to the victim's life."215 
Such comparisons are wrought with danger as Justice Powell suggested 
in his majority opinion in Booth.216 As Powell noted: 
The prospect of a "mini-trial" on the victim's character is more than simply 
unappealing; it could well distract the sentencing jury from its 
constitutionally required task-determining whether the death penalty is 
appropriate in light of the background and record of the accused and the 
particular circumstances of the crime.217 
Since in a capital sentencing the defendant has already been convicted of 
murder218 the comparison of his life to the life of almost any victim will be 
dreadfully undesirable. Indeed, defense counsel may be unfairly compelled 
to abandon all confrontation of the victims in an effort to have the jury 
reflect as little on the suffering of the victims as possible or to recommend to 
his client that there should be no jury at all. 
VI. GUESS WHO'S COMING TO DINNER? RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND THE 
UNINVITED CONSEQUENCES OF VICTIM IMPACT INFORMATION 
The issue of racial discrimination against African Americans in capital 
sentencing has presented one of the most perplexing problems of criminal 
justice.219 Of course, problems in discrimination in the criminal justice 
215. Coyne, supra note 207, at 614. Although I have strong reservations about a 
strategy that would force a confrontation of character between the defendant and the surviving 
victims, Professor Coyne is quite correct that in the rare instance when an attorney would 
engage such a battle, he not do so blindly. More important, it may be that the nature of the 
victim impact information received by counsel prior to trial allows the defendant and counsel 
to agree that such a contest is best if held in front of a judge rather than a jury. 
216. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07 (1987). 
217. Id. at 507. 
218. See supra note 210. 
219. For two particularly insightful reviews of the problem of racial discrimination in 
capital punishment, see Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE LJ. 
420,439-43 (1988) (suggesting that jurors are influenced by the race of both the victim and 
the defendant) and Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and 
the Supreme Court, 10 I HARV. L. REV. 1388 (l988) (discussing historical disparities in 
punishment between white and black). 
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system have not been confined exclusively to persons of African descent.220 
The problem, however, has been more acute when African Americans are 
defendants in capital cases and, as a result, the statistical data substantiating 
the existence of racial bias is virtually unassailable.221 Even the Supreme 
220. The measure of justice received in this country has often been linked to racial, 
ethnic or religious prejudice. In Maryland in 1717 ,laws were enacted that prohibited not only 
blacks, but Indians and Mulattos from testifying in any case in which a Christian white person 
was concerned. These provisions applied to such persons whether they were slave or free. 
JEFFREY R. BRACKET[, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND: A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTION OF SLAVERY 
191 (1891) (Herbert B. Adams ed. 1969). Another Maryland report commissioned in the early 
1960s observed that in the years 1936-1961 of the 122 persons sentenced to death in 
Baltimore City about 80 percent of those executed were African-American. LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL COMMITTEE, REPORT ON CAPITAL PuNISHMENT, at 41 (October 3, 1962) cited in THE 
REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE DEATH PENALTY: AN ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN MARYLAND: 1978-1993 (November 1993) (on file with Professor Edward A. 
Tomlinson, Faculty Reporter to the Governor's Commission, at the Thurgood Marshall Law 
Library at the University of Maryland School of Law) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION 
REPORT]. 
In Virginia during the early 1800's, negroes were not even permitted to testify in murder 
trials against a white defendant. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & F. Michael Higginbotham, 
"Yearning to Breathe Free": Legal Barriers Against and Options in Favor of Liberty in 
Antebellum Virginia, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1213, 1239-40 n.l42 (l993). 
In the mid-1800s a California court overturned the conviction of a white man charged 
with murdering a Chinese woman since the testimony suggesting guilt was supported in part 
by the testimony of a Chinese witness. People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 {I 854). The court reasoned 
that the statute preventing "blacks," "mulattos," and Indians from testifying against whites 
also applied to Chinese since the statute was designed to protect whites from testimony of all 
nonwhites. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical 
Race Theory. Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1291 n.241 
(1993). 
In 1913, the oft-noted case of Leo Frank occurred. Frank, the Jewish victim of a Georgia 
mob, was falsely accused of murdering Mary Phagan, a thirteen-year-old girl who worked for 
him in an Atlanta factory. That Frank was Jewish arguably played a role in the decision of the 
mob to act. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PuNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 191 
(1993). 
Native Americans were victims of the greatest single day of mass government-
sanctioned execution in United States history. A military commission tried nearly 400 Dakota 
Indians and executed 38 after a small war between the Dakotas and white settlers. [d. at 97 
(citing Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Justice, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 13 (1990». 
221 . Even the Supreme Court has recognized that racial discrimination "still remains a 
fact of life, in the administration of justice as in our society as a whole. Perhaps today that 
discrimination takes a form more subtle than before. But it is not real or less pernicious." 
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,558-59 (1979). See also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
286 (l987) (citing a study conducted by Professors David C. Baldus, George Woodworth and 
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Court in McCleskey v. Kemp222 could not ignore the obvious statistical 
disparity, particularly when the victim is white and the defendant is African-
American.223 In McCleskey, a sharply divided Supreme Court held 5-4 that 
despite the racial disparity generated by the statistical studies, McCleskey, an 
African American, could not make out a sufficient claim to invalidate his 
death sentence on equal protection grounds.224 
Ironically, Justice Lewis Powell, who not only authored the Court's 
opinion in McCleskey, but who also crafted the Booth decision, reported in a 
1991 interview that McCleskey should have been decided differently and that 
he would no longer favor capital punishment if he were still on the Supreme 
Court.225 The controversy race and capital punishment has generated has led 
to recent unsuccessful efforts to pass laws in both federal and state 
legislatures to mitigate the effect of discrimination by placing the burden on 
the prosecution to show that seeking a death sentence is not based on racial 
considerations.226 
Charles Pulaski); Samuel R. Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial 
Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REV. 27, 39 
(1984). 
222. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
223. [d. at 286-87. 
224. [d. at 299 (McClesky also challenged his sentence on 8th Amendment grounds). 
225. In an interview with his former law clerk, Professor John C. Jeffries, Jr. of the 
University of Virginia Law School, Justice Powell was asked whether he would change his 
vote in any case. He responded: 
"Yes, McCleskey v. Kemp," 
"Do you mean you would now accept the argument from statistics?" 
"No, I would vote the other way in any capital case." 
"In 'any' capital case?" 
"Yes" 
"Even Furman v. Georgia?" 
"Yes, I have come to think that capital punishment should be abolished." 
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. AND THE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 451-
52 (1994). 
226. A federal bill known as the Racial Justice Act (H.R. 4017), intended to amend 
title 28 of the United States Code and to prevent racial discrimination in capital sentencing, 
was reported on favorably by the House of Representatives on March 24,1994. H.R. 4017, 
103 Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). The report's purpose clause stated that the law would allow a 
court consider evidence that established "a consistent pattern of racial discriminatory death 
sentences in the sentencing jurisdiction, taking into account the nature of the cases being 
compared, the prior records of the offenders, and other statutorily appropriate non-racial 
characteristics." H.R. REP. No. 103-458, at 1 (1993). The relevant provisions of the statute 
provided that: 
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§ 2921. Prohibition against the execution of a sentence of death imposed on the 
basis of race 
(a) IN GENERAL. No person shall be put to death under color of State or 
Federal law in the execution of a sentence that was imposed based on race. 
(b) INFERENCE OF RACE AS THE BASIS OF DEATH SENTENCE. An inference that 
race was the basis of a death sentence is established if valid evidence is presented 
demonstrating that, at the time the death sentence was imposed, race was a 
statistically significant factor in decisions to seek or to impose the sentence of death 
in the jurisdiction in question. 
(c) RELEVANT EVIDENCE. Evidence relevant to establish an inference that race 
was the basis of a death sentence may include evidence that death sentences were, at 
the time pertinent under subsection (b), being imposed significantly more frequently 
in the jurisdiction in question-
(1) upon persons of one race than upon persons of another race; or 
(2) as punishment for capital offenses against persons of one race than as 
punishment for capital offenses against persons of another race. 
(d) VALIDITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED To EsTABLISH AN INFERENCE. If 
statistical evidence is presented to establish an inference that race was the basis of a 
sentence of death, the court shall determine the validity of the evidence and if it 
provides a basis for the inference. Such evidence must take into account, to the extent 
it is compiled and publicly made available, evidence of the statutory aggravating 
factors of the crimes involved, and shall include comparisons of similar cases 
involving persons of different races. 
(e) REBUTTAL. If an inference that race was the basis of a death sentence is 
established under subsection (b), the death sentence may not be carried out unless the 
government rebuts the inference by a preponderance of the evidence. Unless it can 
show that the death penalty was sought in all cases fitting the statutory criteria for 
imposition of the death penalty, the government cannot rely on mere assertions that it 
did not intend to discriminate or that the cases in which death was imposed fit the 
statutory criteria for imposition of the death penalty. 
Id.at 12-13. 
The federal provision failed in the Senate. 1994-95 CONGo Q. ALMANAC-1994, 103d 
Congo (2d Sess.) 282 (1995). Among the criticisms of the proposed law was the notion that 
the act offends notions of individual justice. The dissenting views to H.R. 4017 argued that 
the criminal justice process is designed to allow the jury to carefully consider a number of 
factors-which do not easily lend themselves to statistical quantification.ld. at 14-17. 
The purpose of individualized justice is to ensure that each defendant has his or her 
case carefully decided on its own merits-without regard to other defendants. The 
Racial Justice Act would create a system of statistically proportional justice where 
the penalty received would depend on ones [sic] membership or the membership of 
ones [sic] victim in a particular racial class. 
/d. at 16. 
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When the victims are white, historically a black defendant is treated 
more harshly.227 Throughout the post-civil war era African Americans were 
exposed to "summary justice" in the form of lynchings.228 A primary 
motivation for this form of violent proceeding was the nature of the crime as 
it related to the status of the victim.229 This history of bias may be the 
unwelcome factor in the continuing statistical disparity that exists in the 
imposition of capital punishment. Some studies demonstrate that African 
Americans do commit crime at a higher rate compared to their relative 
numbers in the population.230 But even that fact does not explain the 
profound effect that the race of the victim231 has in predicting who will be 
executed and who will be spared.232 Several studies conducted during the 
227. A 1849 Virginia law made it a crime to use "provoking language or menacing 
gestures" to a white person. The law applied to both free blacks and slaves. Code Va. 1849, 
tit. 54, chap. 200, § 8, p. 754 (cited in FRIEDMAN, supra note 220, at 90 & n.28). 
228. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO 
AMERICANS 439 (3d ed. 1967). Between 1889 and 1922, there were 3,436 lynchings in the 
United States. ld. at 488. 
229. Lynching as a form of alternative system of justice has been explored by legal 
scholars. One scholar has commented that the race of the victim of the alleged offense (in 
most cases white women) motivated vigilante action from those too angry or too impatient to 
wait for the judicial process to work. Professor Lawrence M. Friedman writes: 
[T]he mob decided that honor demanded direct action-the honor of the white 
woman, her family, and the community. The lynching was part of an "unwritten 
code." Southerners distrusted the state, and preferred, in these cases, "personal 
justice." They "believed strongly that community justice included both statutory law 
and lynch law"; indeed, lynch law "was perceived as a legitimate extension of the 
formal legal system." 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 220, at 190 (citing ROBERT P. INGALLS, URBAN VIGILANTES IN THE NEW 
SOUTH: TAMPA 1882-1936 4 (1988». For another excellent review of the complicated 
question of the role lynching played in the system of punishment in America, see W. 
FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH (1993). 
230. JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE 461 
(1985). Blacks are overrepresented by a factor of four to one among persons arrested for 
violent crimes (and represent about 1/2 of those arrested for murder and rape).ld. 
Ironically, African-Americans are overwhelmingly more likely to be the victims of 
homicide. The overall rate at which black men are killed is more than six times greater than 
the rate at which white men are killed, and for black males age 25-29 the rate of homicide is 
over seven-times higher. ld. at 463-65. In 1994, blacks represented 1,432 per 100,000 
prisoners, while whites only registered a rate of 203 per 100,000. BUREAU OF JUSTICE 1994 
STATISTICS cited in Bernard Gauzer, Life Behind Bars, PARADE, Aug. 13, 1995 at 4. 
231 . See supra note 219. 
232. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 77 (1973). One white lawyer made the following observations regarding the 
issue of race and punishment in the Upper South in a 1940 letter: 
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twentieth century overwhelmingly support the existence of this racial bias in 
punishment. For example, "Texas Courts indicted some 500 white men for 
the murder of blacks in 1865 and 1866, but not one was convicted."233 
About seventy-five years later, in Florida in 1940, forty-five out of forty-
eight blacks were sentenced to death for the rape of white women, while no 
white men were sentenced to death for the rape of black women.234 
Similarly, when Marvin Wolfgang studied the relationship between rape as a 
capital offense and the race of the victim as it relates to capital punishment, 
he found that "during the twenty year period from 1945 to 1965 in seven 
southern states ... there has been a systematic, differential practice of 
imposing the death penalty on blacks for rape and, most particularly, when 
the defendants are black and their victims are white.',235 
Of course, all of these disparities were not created by sentencing juries 
alone, but much of what the statistics may indicate is unarticulated, 
unconscious racial bias. Justice Harry Blackmun recently addressed these 
concerns in Callins v. Collins: 
The arbitrariness inherent in the sentencer's discretion to afford mercy is 
exacerbated by the problem of race. Even under the most sophisticated death 
penalty statutes, race continues to playa major role in determining who shall 
(June 19, 1940): "When the cases involve no such issues [on the race question] but 
are merely cases, I have noted that cases between Negro and Negro are handled 
somewhat differently than cases between white and white. I mean a spirit of levity, 
an expectation of something 'comical' appears to exist. The seriousness in the white 
vs. Negro case is decidedly lacking. As you know it is a rare case indeed in which a 
Negro who has murdered a Negro receives the extreme penalty, either death or life 
imprisonment here, regardless of the facts. Only the other day in a local case a Negro 
who murdered another with robbery as a motive. a charge that would have been as 
between white and white, or Negro and white victim, good for the electric chair, was 
disposed of by a jury with a 15 year sentence. The punishment as between Negro and 
Negro, as distinguished from white vs. white, or Negro vs. white victim, is decidedly 
different and clearly shows the racial approach to the question. In short the court-
room feeling is that the Negro is entirely inferior, with punishment for crimes by him 
against his own kind punished with less punishment than when the white man is 
involved." 
. ARNOLD ROSE, THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 180 n.8 (1944). 
233. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION, AMERICA'S UNFINISHEOREVOLUTION 204 (1990). 
234. Meltsner, supra note 232, at 76-77. 
235. MARVIN E. WOLFGANG. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR 
RAPE, in BOWERS, supra note 157, at 109-113 (1974). See also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584 (1976) (invalidating capital punishment for rape when no homicide is committed in part 
because of disparities regarding the race of the victim). 
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live and who shall die. Perhaps it should not be surprising that the biases and 
prejudices that infect society generally would influence the detennination of 
who is sentenced to death .... 236 
419 
Blackmun went on to discuss the racial statistics offered in McCleskey. 
He relied on Justice Brennan's dissent, which noted that unrefuted studies 
showed that blacks who kill whites are sentenced to death "at nearly 22 times 
the rate of blacks who kill blacks ... ,"237 characterizing the evidence of 
racial prejudice in McCleskey as "staggering."238 
The problem identified in McCleskey has not abated. One Georgia study 
indicated from 1973 to 1990 African Americans comprise 65 percent of 
murder victims, while whites comprise 35 percent. The death penalty was 
sought in 85 percent of the murder cases that involved white victims, but 
only in 15 percent of those involving black victims.239 The unexplained 
racial disparity that has existed in capital punishment cannot be ignored. The 
link between racial discrimination and the possibility that a jury will impose 
death because its members identify with the victim rather than the defendant 
is always a possibility. For example, if a jury has few or no African 
Americans, and there is an African American defendant a death sentence 
may be more likely. More jurors may identify with the victim because of 
characteristics the jury perceives it shares with the victim.240 
It is, of course, difficult to generalize about how juries go about the 
business of imposing death. One thing, however, is certain: the racial 
statistics haunt the capital sentencing process in America.241 The existence 
236. Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1153 (1992)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
237. [d. (quoting McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 327 (1987». 
238. [d. See also HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF 
THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 239-40 (1993) (citing a section of the 
"Chattahoochee Report" entitled "Victims' Families: A Contrast in Black and White" at 3). 
239. [d. 
240. The American Bar Association has supported legislation focusing on eliminating 
the death penalty based on either the race of the victim or the race of the offender. In 
congressional hearings held on February 22,1994, Professor Randolph N. Stone, Chairperson 
of the ABA's Criminal Justice Section stated that the policy of the ABA was to support 
"enactment of federal and state legislation which strives to eliminate any racial consideration 
in capital sentencing." Hearings on H.R. 3315 and 3355 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and 
Crim. Justice, House Jud. Comm., available in 1994 WL 14168864, at *3. See A.B.A. House 
of Delegates Report No. 109 (Annual Meeting 1988) 35.T. 
241. During a Capital Hill hearing concerning habeas corpus, Ronald S. Matthias, 
Deputy Attorney General of California, suggested that the existence of unexplained racial 
impact on capital sentencing does not suggest that one should "assume, in the absence of 
proof, that the 'criminal justice system values victims differently' based on their race and that 
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of racial discrimination in the criminal justice system through the centuries 
has left a stain on the entire capital sentencing process. The specter of racial 
prejudice intrudes on efforts to institute a systematic and neutral death 
penalty. 
Can we be sure that juries do not impose death based on their own 
personal bias or prejudices?242 As long as victim impact plays a role in 
capital sentencing, comparison of the victim to the defendant by jurors is 
inevitable. Jurors will use their personal views and experiences to make such 
comparisons. If the statistics indicating racial disparity reflect subconscious 
racism in the sentencing process, there is no reason to expect that such 
factors it will not continue. It will remain difficult to determine when and 
how racial considerations have intruded on the capital sentencing process.243 
One group of commentators, led by the well-regarded expert on racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing, Professor David Baldus,244 has 
suggested that it may be possible to eliminate racial discrimination in capital 
sentencing.245 They argue that "[wJith proper procedures and firm 
enforcement of proscriptions against racial discrimination . . . capital 
sentencing systems can be largely purged of the discrimination that currently 
a murderer whose victim is white will for that reason be punished more severely than a victim 
whose murderer is a person of color." Habeas Corpus: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Congo 531 (1994) 
(statement of Ronald S. Mathias, Deputy Attorney General of California). 
242. Recent public attention brought to the jury process by the sensational OJ. 
Simpson murder case suggests that, like it or not, race influences our attitudes about the 
justice system. One pollster noted that "[oln almost every issue, blacks and whites are nearly 
mirror images of one another-on Simpson's innocence, police conduct, and the jury's 
efforts." Betty Streisand et aI., The Verdict's Aftermath, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT Oct. 
16, 1995, at 34. Simpson was acquitted by a majority black jury for the killing of his ex-wife 
and a friend. Another poll taken after the case suggested that 36 percent of whites believed 
that black jurors are more likely to convict a defendant who is white and 59 percent of black 
jurors and 40 percent of white jurors believed white jurors are more likely to convict a 
defendant if he is black. Joe Urschel, Poll: A Nation More Divided, USA TODAY, Oct. 9, 
1995,at5A. 
243. In the early years of our country's history, the system of criminal justice in 
capital cases for blacks, both free and slave, was meager at best. In South Carolina, for 
example, blacks had no right to a trial by jury and no right to appeal a capital offense prior to 
1833. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MAITER OF COLOR, RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 180 (1978). Such examples of inequality in process at 
the foundation of our legal system, while not dispositive, cannot be ignored. 
244. David C. Baldus et aI., Reflections on the "Inevitability" of Racial 
Discrimination in Capital Sentencing and the "Impossibility" of Its Prevention, Detection, 
and Correction, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 359 (1994). 
245. Id. at 359-63. 
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exists."246 The absence of substantial legislative action in this area, It IS 
suggested, "enable judges and legislators to avoid difficult choices."247 It is 
further explained by the writers that by failing to take steps to eliminate 
discrimination in capital sentencing, states avoid recognition of the 
legitimacy of claims of racial discrimination in individual cases and thus 
avoid the "additional cost, complexity and delay"248 of permitting such 
claim to be established. "Thus, acceptance of claims of impossibility and 
inevitability avoids the necessity to confront a variety of unpalatable issues. 
Acceptance of these claims also avoids responsibility for the existing state of 
affairs and justifies the status quo."249 
Assuming that Professor Baldus and his colleagues are correct in their 
assertion that discrimination in capital sentencing may be eliminated or 
dramatically reduced, the question of what procedures might realistically be 
implemented remains. Dramatic legislative reform of capital punishment 
statutes to take into account specific racial discrimination challenges is 
highly unlikely.250 Abolition of capital punishment is an even more remote 
prospect.251 Thus, we are left with the current system, unable to justify or 
explain the "staggering" racial discrimination statistics and victim-based 
preference that it seems to encourage. Indeed, even the most recent collection 
of statistical evidence suggests that the problem has not changed. A general 
accounting office report on the death penalty reviewed 28 empirical studies 
of the death penalty and discovered in 82 percent of them, "race of [the] 
246. [d. at 359. Some scholars have rejected the view that racism can be eliminated 
from our society and thus, cannot be eliminated from jury decisions to impose capital 
punishment. Professor Derrick Bell writes that "Black people will never gain full equality in 
this country. Even- those Herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than 
temporary 'peaks of progress.''' DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE 
PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12 (1992). 
247. Baldus, supra note 244, at 417 . 
248. [d. at 362. 
249. [d. at 363. 
250. [d. at 418. The only federal legislative response to the problem of racial 
discrimination in capital sentencing is a provision that requires that the judge instruct the jury 
that in considering whether death is justified "it shall not consider the race, color, religious 
beliefs, national origin, or sex of the defendant or of any victim." 18 V.S.C.A. § 3593(f). If 
the jury finds "death," each member must sign a certificate that race nor any of the other 
prohibited matters entered into their decision. [d. A particular capital defendant may not 
believe that this section offers sufficient protection against discrimination and may still elect a 
judge sentencing. This provision appears to adopt the policy endorsed by the American Bar 
Association. See supra note 240. 
251. See supra note 139, citing the growing popUlarity of capital punishment. 
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victim was found to influence the likelihood of being charged with capital 
murder or receiving the death penalty."252 
VII. THE CASE FOR PRETRIAL DISCLOSURE: JURY OR NO JURY? THAT IS THE 
QUESTION 
The demand for victim participation in the sentencing process has been 
overwhelming. The political process has recognized their cause and has 
passed legislation to advance the goals of the victim's rights movement.253 
The Supreme Court responded by overruling Booth in order to remove a 
substantial constitutional impediment to victim participation in capital· 
sentencing.254 
What remains is the question of whether the legislatures or courts will 
respond to the serious concerns left unaddressed by Payne regarding how our 
justice system should manage victim impact information in capital jury 
sentencing. 
I propose that a rather complete disclosure of victim impact testimony be 
made pre-trial. Such disclosure should include notification of how many 
persons wish to provide information, the contents of their statement, and 
whether their statement would be offered in oral or written form.255 This 
disclosure should be made very early in the capital sentencing process. 
252. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH 
INDICATES PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 5 (1990). 
253. See supra note 137. 
254. See discussion notes 54-85. 
255. I would propose the following statutory scheme to make the use of victim impact 
evidence more predictable. 
(A) If a prosecutor has filed a notice to seek the death penalty in accordance with 
state law he shall, in compliance with this subsection, file a notice of intent to 
introduce victim impact testimony at least 30 days prior to the time that 
defendant is required to make his election of a fact finder in the case. Such 
notice shall set out in reasonable detail a list of potential witnesses expected to 
offer victim impact testimony and provide a written summary of the proposed 
testimony of each potential witness. 
(8) A notice of intent to present impact testimony shall with reasonable specificity: 
(i) identify the name, address and relationship of the proposed witness to the 
victim. 
(ii) briefly summarize the testimony the witness intends to present regarding 
the economic and emotional harm they have suffered as a result of the 
crime. 
(a) If the surviving victim is a minor, a parent or guardian may assist 
the prosecutor with providing the disclosure under this subsection. 
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Pre-trial disclosure is the only viable solution to the major problems that 
the use of victim impact in capital sentencing creates. I offer this proposal on 
the assumption that in cases where the victim impact infonnation is 
extremely emotional and extensive, the most important decision the 
defendant can make is whether he wants a lay jury to decide the question of 
death at all.256 Some infonnation intended to be offered by the victim could 
be so volatile that a defendant would rather take his chances with a trained 
(iii) State which surviving victims intend to present oral testimony in open 
court and which will submit a written statement to the jury, or both. 
(a) If the prosecutor intends to read a victim impact statement on behalf 
of the victims, such an intention should be made at the time of the 
notice referred to in this subsection. 
(b) If the prosecutor intends to offer victim impact testimony through a 
representative family member or surviving victim, such an 
intervention should be made at the time of the notice referred to in 
this subsection. 
(c) A victim impact statement shall not be presented to the jury unless 
the prosecutor has complied with the notice provisions of this 
subsection. 
(C) Prior to the time for filing a disclosure, a prosecutor may make a motion for a 
protective order or a postponement to provide disclosure for good cause 
shown. Any such motion shall be conducted at a time sufficient to provide the 
defendant 30 days prior to his election of the factfinder. 
(D) After the prosecution's disclosure, the defendant shall file a notice of intention 
to object to the proposed victim impact testimony and with reasonable 
specificity state which portions of the proposed victim impact testimony that 
the defendant intends to object, and offer concise reasons for that objection. 
(E) If a motion to object to victim impact testimony is filed by the defendant, the 
judge shall set a hearing prior to defendant's election of a sentencer and rule on 
the defendant's objections. Any grounds for defendant's objections to victim 
impact testimony that are not made prior to trial pursuant to this subsection 
shall only be entertained by the trial court in its discretion and for good cause 
shown. Defense counsel shall be required to renew his objections to the victim 
impact testimony out of the presence of the jury at the time of the sentencing 
hearing or such objections will be deemed to be waived. 
256. As noted earlier, most states do provide for an option of jury or judge sentencing. 
See supra note 5. However, the problem of electing a factfinder may become more 
complicated in those states which require that once a defendant elects a judge for guilt or 
innocence he may not request a jury for sentencing purpose only. See Stephen Gillers, 
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 102-19 (1980) (article noting that Colorado, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Utah and Wyoming provide that a waiver of a jury trial on guilt or innocence 
constitutes a waiver of a jury sentencing). 
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professional jurist.257 It is doubtful that a defendant could make a knowing 
and intelligent election of a factfinder without knowledge of the most 
potentially damaging information to be offered against him.258 
Although the Supreme Court has recognized the right to some Due 
Process protection in criminal sentencing in the area of discovery,259 it has 
never gone so far as to create a right to discovery prior to jury selection in 
order to assist a defendant in the sentencing phase of a capital case. The 
Supreme Court has recognized, however, that the unique character of death 
as punishment makes it different and thus different rules may be required in 
order to advance the goal of fair sentencing.260 The need for early pretrial 
disclosure emanates from the confusion caused by the fact that victim impact 
information does not have a clear position in most capital punishment 
schemes. 
Most states that have capital punishment utilize a process of weighing 
and balancing aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in 
257. It has long been suggested that a "judges' repeated experience with criminal 
cases will often fit him better to deal fairly and scientifically with convicted defendants than 
an ordinary jury." LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO ApPEAL 537 
(1947). See also State v. Gulbrandson, 906 P.2d 579 (Ariz. 1995) Uudges are capable of not 
focusing on irrelevant testimony in a victim impact statement); State v. Williams, 904 P.2d 
437 (Ariz. 1995) (absent evidence to the contrary a trial judge in a capital case is capable of 
focusing on relevant sentencing factors and setting aside the irrelevant, inflammatory and 
emotional factors); State v. Bolton, 896 P.2d 830 (Ariz. 1995) (victim's testimony not 
relevant to sentencing factors was improper but trial court was presumed not to have 
considered it); State v. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d 878,882 (Ohio 1995) (three-judge panel was 
presumed not to consider remarks regarding victims' recommendation of sentence). 
258. The Supreme Court has recognized that important decisions, such as waiving 
rights or exercising choices, should be made with "the express and intelligent consent of the 
defendant." Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930). It would be impossible to 
make a reasonably intelligent choice while exercising the right without sufficient information 
about what the prosecution intends to present. 
259. See supra notes 182-89. The Supreme Court has recognized that due process does 
require time allowed to receive information and prepare for an issue in a capital sentencing 
he?ring, however, the Court has never issued a discovery ruling requiring that a defendant be 
given information which is designed to help him select a jury or elect his factfinder prior to a 
death penalty case. 
260. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (Supreme Court 
recognized that "the qualitative difference of death from all other punishment requires a 
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny by capital sentencing determinations"). It is, 
however, ironic that in the area of civil litigation reform, the bench and bar have recently 
moved to a position that endorses open discovery. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) (provides for 
mandatory prediscovery disclosure in civil cases). 
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order to determine if death is an appropriate sentence.261 In most statutes, 
victim impact is not an aggravating circumstance and accordingly does not 
require that pretrial disclosure be provided to the defendant.262 The recently 
enacted federal death penalty law's victim impact provisions make early 
notice to the defendant by the prosecutor only optiona1.263 The fact that the 
jurors do not know how victim impact fits into the sentencing scheme may 
lead to arbitrary results.264 
261. For an excellent article describing the variety of weighing and balancing statutes 
across the country, see James R. Acker & Charles S. Lanier, Matters of Life or Death: The 
Sentencing Provisions in Capital Punishment Statutes, 31 CRIM. L. BULL. 19-60 (1995). 
262. Several courts have recently addressed the question of whether victim impact is 
an aggravating circumstance or even has an aggravating effect on a death sentence. Many of 
the courts examining the issue have reached the conclusion that it does not. See State v. 
Williams, 904 P.2d 437, 453 (Ariz. 1995) (court found that victim impact is not an 
aggravating circumstance); see also State v. Greenway, 823 P.2d 22, 30 (Ariz. 1991) (court 
held victim impact not to be an aggravating circumstance); Windom v. State, 656 So. 2d 432, 
438 (Fla. 1995) (court found that victim impact is not a nonstatutory aggravating 
circumstance). It may be that many statutes do not list '" victim impact' as an aggravating 
factor" but it cannot be questioned that it is offered to assist the jury in determining that death 
is an appropriate sentence. 
263. The recently enacted federal death penalty law makes provisions for 
consideration of victim impact in determining whether seeking the death penalty is 
appropriate. This law provides that as part of mandatory notice to the defendant, the 
government may include factors concerning the effect of the crime on the victim and the 
victim's family. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(a)(2) (West 1996). However, the statute does not list 
victim impact as an aggravating factor, but merely as a "factor." This may present 
constitutional problems when a jury attempts to "factor" the victim's value into its 
deliberation. See infra note 264. Furthermore, even if the government exercises its option to 
provide notice of victim impact before trial, the statute does not make it clear how much 
detail is required or whether there is a sanction for failing to provide such notice. 
264. In Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 368 (1988), the Supreme Court recognized 
that potential jury confusion might be a basis upon which to invalidate a capital sentence. 
The Supreme Court has stated that "in a State where the sentencer weighs aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, the weighing of an invalid aggravating circumstance violates 
the Eighth Amendment." Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081 (1992). See also Sochor v. 
Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 231 (1992); Parker v. 
Dugger, 498 U.S. 308, 315 (1991); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738,752 (1990). The 
Supreme Court explained: 
[t]here is Eighth Amendment error when the sentencer weighs an "invalid" 
aggravating circumstance in reaching the ultimate decision to impose a death 
sentence. Employing an invalid aggravating factor in the weighing process "creates 
the possibility ... of randomness," by placing a "thumb [on] death's side of the 
scale," thus "creating the risk [of] treating the defendant as more deserving of the 
death penalty," Even when other valid aggravating factors exist as well, merely 
affirming a sentence reached by weighing an invalid aggravating factor deprives a 
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If victim impact is not an aggravating circumstance, what do you balance 
it against? Certainly it is not a mitigating circumstance so it must have some 
characteristics of an aggravating circumstance since it is offered by the 
prosecution to support its demand for a death sentence. The current system 
that makes it unclear how victim impact is to be considered could 
theoretically permit a sentencing jury to determine that victim impact might 
be sufficient to outweigh all mitigating factors when combined with any 
other aggravating factor proven under a given statute. Since the law does not 
make clear how victim impact is to be weighed or by what standard of proof 
it should be measured, it becomes an arbitrary "wild card" in the capital 
punishment scheme. Its aggravating effect may never be revealed because its 
absence as an aggravating factor on the jury verdict sheet provides no clue as 
to how it assisted the jurors in outweighing the mitigating circumstances. 
In a case where highly emotional victim impact testimony may be 
offered, jurors may believe that they could find it aggravating and thereafter 
give whatever weight deemed necessary until the balance equaled "death." 
The fact that it is unclear how it should be considered may lead a defendant 
to avoid the risks of juror confusion altogether by avoiding a jury sentencing. 
The serious problems a defense attorney may encounter when attempting to 
cross-examine a victim or otherwise challenge the veracity of their character 
or suffering265 may further reinforce the conclusion that a judge sentencing 
would more desirable.266 
Pre-trial disclosure advances the goal of an orderly death penalty by 
integrating the victim impact information into a predictable pre-trial 
procedure in much the same way such hearings are used in most jurisdictions 
with suppression motions or motions in limine held pre-trial.267 Questions of 
defendant of "the individualized treatment that would result from actual reweighing 
of the mix of mitigating factors and aggravating circumstances." 
Sochor, 504 U.S. at 527,532 (citations omitted). 
265. See discussion supra Section V, on confrontation. 
266. In one Maryland capital case that involved a felony murder and highly emotional 
victim impact testimony, three separate juries rendered a death sentence. Harris v. State, 539 
A.2d 637 (1988). After the fourth remand, the defendant requested a court sentencing and 
received a life sentence. [d. It may have been that the victim impact testimony was too 
damaging for any jury to consider a life sentence. 
267. The motion in limine, which is a device used to deal with potentially prejudicial 
matters at pretrial and out of the presence of the jury, has become an accepted mechanism to 
assure the accused's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial. See Douglas L. 
Colbert, The Motion in Limine in Politically Sensitive Cases: Silencing the Defendant at 
Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274-81 (J 987) (presenting a cogent discussion of the history 
and development of the motion in limine). 
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relevance and the scope of the victim impact information can be examined 
by the judge exercising appropriate discretion as to what will be introduced 
at a sentencing hearing long before the jury is empaneled.268 
In those extremely rare instances when a defendant may want to 
challenge the validity of the victim impact information, pre-trial disclosure 
will provide adequate time to investigate and prepare challenges to the 
victims' testimony. Any attorney preparing a case obviously cannot confront 
testimony without adequate investigation.269 
Pre-trial disclosure facilitates the defendant's preparation of mitigation 
so that he may respond to the adverse effects of victim impact testimony,270 
since victim impact testimony is likely to have an aggravating effect on the 
jury .271 Pre-trial disclosure helps eliminate the prosecutor's strategic 
advantage in controlling the use and timing of victim impact testimony at 
trial.272 
The early disclosure of victim impact testimony facilitates the process of 
capital jury selection by providing the defendant with information about 
what the jury will hear if they find the defendant eligible for death.273 
The assistance of the victim impact information in jury selection is 
particularly important, considering the limitations recently placed on the 
defendant in exercising peremptory challenges in fashioning the jury that 
268. Procedure should pennit election after the defendant finds out what victim impact 
is being presented as evidence. 
269. Failure to engage in proper pre-trial investigation by defense counsel has been 
held to be a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel and of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process provisions. See Kimmelmon v. 
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 366 (1986); Sullivan v. Fainnan, 819 F.2d 1382, 1391-93 (7th Cir. 
1987) (failure to contact witnesses who would have contradicted government witness). 
Complete failure to investigate does not necessarily lead to reversal. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776, 777 (1987); Hoots v. Allsbrook, 785 F.2d 1214, 1221 (4th Cir. 1986) (failure to 
investigate was not prejudicial error); Ballou v. Booker, 777 F.2d 910, 914 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(defense counsel's failure to interview rape victim or physician did not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel); Aldrich v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630, 633 (I Ith Cir. 1985) (counsel's 
admission that he was unprepared and his failure to investigate state's witnesses were 
unreasonable perfonnances but not prejudicial). 
270. Coyne, supra note 207. 
271. This seems obvious since the tragedy of the victim's loss told to a sentencing jury 
is certainly not mitigating evidence. 
272. Most statutes that govern the use of victim impact are silent as to at what stage of 
the proceeding it may be offered. 
273. Since in most capital cases the same jury will consider guilt and punishment, a 
defendant may have to select a jury as much for its consideration of possible punishment as 
for any other factor. 
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will decide his fate. No longer can a defendant challenge on the basis of the 
prospective jurors' race or gender in an effort to shape the outcome of his 
trial.274 This alone may be sufficient reason to make a jury trial less 
desirable. Thus, pretrial disclosure will permit the defendant to either elect 
no jury or select a jury he believes to be fair.275 Add to the equation the 
long-held concerns that capital juries are already "conviction prone" by the 
manner in which they are selected,276 and a jury sentencing without full use 
of peremptory challenges may become less desirable. 
Policy reasons for pre-trial disclosure should not favor only the 
defendant. There are several advantages of pre-trial disclosure that benefit 
the victims as well. First, pre-trial disclosure facilitates the effective 
assistance of counsel277 preparing a capital case. Enhancing preparation of 
defense counsel reduces the prospect of appellate reversal of a death sentence 
and reduces many potential areas of collateral attack.278 This will result in 
274. The doctrine first announced in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), 
permitting a defense counsel to object to a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a 
discriminatory manner was recently extended to defense counsel permitting prosecutors to 
object to their challenges as well. See also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992). Two 
terms later, the Supreme Court extended its prohibition to peremptory challenges based on the 
juror's gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994). These new prohibitions 
dramatically change the strategic tools that an attorney may use to shape a capital defendant's 
jury and obtain a jury he believes to be more favorably disposed to the defendant's case. 
275. Jury selection in capital cases requires consideration of many intangible factors 
like sociological data, psychological expertise, skillful questioning and intuition. CALIFORNIA 
ArrORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE & CALIFORNIA PuBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION, 
CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY DEFENSE MANUAL vol. II, p. 11-25. A defendant, after being 
advised of the potential inaccuracy of jury selection might choose a judge. 
276. Although the Supreme Court has held that a capital jury which has been selected 
after all persons who have "scruples" against imposing death have been excluded is not 
unconstitutionally "conviction prone," see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), some 
studies have indicated that such juries are more likely to convict. WaIter E. Oberer, Does 
Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples against Capital Punishment Constitute Denial of a 
Fair Trial an Issue afGuilt?, 39 TEX. L. REV. 545 (1961). A competent defense attorney may 
take such a factor into account when determining with his client the type of sentence that is 
most desirable. 
277. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
278. The American Bar Association has stated concerns that effective counsel should 
be provided very early in the capital sentencing process. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECfIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEW IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES 
(1990); see also Guideline 11.2, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR THE 
ApPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (1989) ("Counsel in 
death penalty cases should be required to perform in the specialized practice of capital 
representation zealously committed to the capital case who has adequate time and recourses 
for preparation."). Some courts have rejected the notion that capital cases require a more 
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fewer reversals on appeal and a shorter time period between the imposition 
of a death sentence and the actual execution.279 The Court in Payne 
specifically reserved the possibility that some victim impact could violate 
due process.280 Pre-trial disclosure will give judges the opportunity to make 
crucial decisions in a more controlled atmosphere.281 
Pre-trial disclosure will permit the judge to accommodate the special 
needs of victims who are going to testify in open court. This would include 
consideration of their special sensitivities and physical needs. Such hearings 
may lead to some victims, with the agreement of counsel, videotaping their 
presentations to avoid interruptions because of emotional breakdowns.282 
Finally, early disclosure supports victim participation in a way that is 
consistent with the goal of facilitating the emotional healing process.283 
Pre-trial disclosure will provide a way for the judge to prevent 
manipulation and abuse of victims by the prosecution284 and harassment by 
the defense.285 No party in the system should be permitted to exploit a 
stringent test for competency of counsel. See State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 352, 561 A.2d 
1082, 1089 (1989). 
The reversal rate of capital cases on appeal has been reported as high as 46.3 percent. See 
David A. Kaplan, Death Mill, USA, NAT'L L.J., May 8,1989, at 38. . 
279. Public disillusionment over delay and the high number of reversals have 
generated negative attitudes from the public concerning the criminal justice system. 
GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 220, at 161. See infra note 289. 
280. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). See Levy, supra note 163. 
281. It seems sensible that a judge may more easily control the atmosphere of a 
courtroom if he has some idea how witnesses who intend to offer emotionally charged 
testimony may react. 
282. A judge taking oral victim impact testimony out of the presence of the jury pre-
trial would be able to prepare to accommodate a victim that was physically impaired or 
demonstrated particularly strong emotional sensitivity while testifying. The judge may even 
feel compelled to preclude live oral testimony if the victim was unable to maintain their 
composure or became prejudicially emotional. 
283. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
284. Some troubling ethical issues may well arise as a result of the prosecutor's effort 
to secure a conviction and death sentence with the aid of victim impact testimony. "For 
example, how actively should a prosecutor seek the aid of grieving friends and family 
members in attempting to secure a death sentence?" RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 302 (1994). Pretrial disclosure may limit 
intentional family manipulation by requiring the prosecution to put its cards "face up" on the 
table. Pre-trial disclosure also permits questioning of victim in the protective atmosphere of 
the courtroom in a controlled pre-trial setting. 
285. Victims of capital homicide have complained that defense counsel often 
subpoena family members of the deceased as potential witnesses "with no intention of calling 
them to testify, simply to keep them out of the site of the jury." Brooks Douglass, Oklahoma's 
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victim for strategic advantage. Controlled management of victim impact 
information is consistent with the goals of fair and non-arbitrary capital 
sentencing.286 
If our system intends to do more than simply pay "lip service" to orderly 
capital sentencing the advantages of pre-trial disclosure is a modest and 
realistic proposal. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that victim participation in capital sentencing is here to 
stay. All indications point to the overwhelming public support for capital 
punishment. The fact that capital punishment is politically popular, however, 
should not prevent reforms that make the system less arbitrary. Victim 
impact testimony is, in many cases, the most important factor in whether a 
capital defendant will receive the ultimate punishment. 
Moral,287 philosophical,288 economic,289 and religious290 arguments 
have been raised against capital punishment over the last several decades. 
Victim Impact Legislation: A New Voice for Victims and Their Families, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 
283,287 (1993). 
286. The Supreme Court has made it clear that "the channeling and limiting of the 
sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamental constitutional 
requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 362 (1988). 
287. One moral perspective on capital punishment is that the state may only take a life 
in order to 
protect its citizenry from the imminent danger of criminal action and in actual 
resistance to felonious attempts "including attempts forcibly to avoid arrest or escape 
custody." Once, however, the prisoner has been apprehended ... the right of the 
State to take his life as punishment, retribution, revenge or retaliation ... does not 
exist in moral law . 
Donald EJ. MacNamara, The Case Against Capital Punishment, Social Action, April 1996, 
at 4-15, reprinted in Statement Against Capital Punishment, THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA: AN ANTHOLOGY 184 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1964). 
288. Some writers have suggested that capital punishment is an unacceptable 
contradiction to the intrinsic worth of a human being. See L.S. Tao, Beyond Furman v. 
Georgia: The Need for A Morally Based Decision on Capital Punishment, 51 NOTRE DAME 
LAWYER 722 (1976). 
289. Some studies of the cost of a capital case through appeal have calculated costs as 
high as $1.8 million. NEW YORK DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION, INC., CAPITAL LOSSES: THE PRICE 
OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR NEW YORK STATE 26 (1982). More conservative estimates have 
been projected. A recent Maryland study estimated that a fully litigated capital case required 
expenditures of about $400,000. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 220, at 193. 
That study characterized the estimates for capital cases over $1.5 million as "excessive." Id. 
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Despite its critics in this country and its abolition in the overwhelming 
majority of western societies,291 the United States has been steadfast in its 
support for capital punishment;292 recently, the popularity of the death 
penalty has even caused a resurrection of capital punishment in places where 
it had been dormant.293 The most recent example of this resurgence is the 
revival of the death penalty in the State of New York.294 . 
Few issues are more politically charged than that of support for the death 
penalty. This is due to the perceived failure of the criminal justice system to 
give victims voice, support, and even vengeance as part of their role in the 
sentencing process. This perception has encouraged many political efforts by 
victims to pursue greater direct influence on the system. While victims gain 
greater rights295 and the courts relax impediments to their participation, 
elected officials emphasize the changing climate as part of their routine 
political discourse.296 Not long ago, the newly-elected governor of New 
York State, George E. Pataki, who ran an election campaign promising to 
revive capital punishment, kept his promise by signing a death penalty bill 
into law as one of his fIrst political acts. He emphasized his support for 
290. From the 1950's through the 1980's, several religious organizations issued 
official resolutions against capital punishment. Among those churches were: the American 
Baptist Church, the American Jewish Committee, American Lutheran Church, the Episcopal 
Church, American Friends Services Committee, the Mennonite Church, the Presbyterian 
Church, United Church of Christ, United Methodist Church, and the United States Catholic 
Conference. CAPITAL PuNISHMENT: WHAT THE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY SAYS, NATIONAL 
INTERRELIGIOUS TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1980). 
291. It has recently been noted that, "[o]f all the countries we resemble in our values 
and political system, none has capital punishment. All of Western Europe, Canada, Australia, 
New Zealand, most of Latin America and even some former Communist nations of Eastern 
Europe have abolished it." JACK GREENBERG, CRusADERS IN THE COURTS 456 (1994). 
292. The United States joins China, Iran, Iraq and Syria as the largest executors in the 
world.ld. See also supra note 139 (statistic supporting the popularity of capital punishment). 
293. Canada has recently discussed reviving capital punishment citing polls that 
reflect as much as 69 percent popular support the return of a death penalty. See Doug Fischer, 
Poll Finds Overwhelming Support for Return of Death Penalty, MONTREAL GAZETTE, July 10, 
1995, at A5; David Crary, Canadians Clamor for Death Penalty, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 
11,1995,at8A. 
294. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 400.27 (setting out procedures for determining sentence of 
death for first degree murder, effective Sept. I, 1995). 
295. See supra notes 119 and 112. 
296. Former President George Bush discussed the Payne case as part of his 
presentation remarks at the National Crime Victims' Rights Awards on April 24, 1992. See 
Levy, supra note 163, at 1029 n.19. 
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victims by signing the bill using the pens of two slain police officers.297 His 
predecessor, Mario Cuomo, a twelve-year incumbent who consistently 
vetoed death penalty legislation, commented that the new law resulted from 
"fear, anger, short sightedness and some cynicism coming together to 
overwhelm intelligence .... It's more than just sad, it's frightening."298 
These statements demonstrate that capital punishment is still an explosive 
and divisive issue in America. 
Whether the reasons the death penalty maintains general strong support 
from public fear, anger or cynicism as former Governor Cuomo suggests, the 
penalty appears to be permanent. With the Supreme Court's decision in 
Payne signaling the willingness of the Court to permit the political process to 
grant greater victim participation, it is highly unlikely that state or federal 
legislators will be eager to suggest victim participation be limited.299 
It is clear that as a society we have not examined the real consequences 
of the Payne decision and our very conscious legislative choice to open the 
death penalty process up to emotional and grief-ridden victims who have an 
understandable desire to participate, but who also have an unpredictable 
influence over the sentencing juries.300 Will their testimony lead to the 
valuing of some lives and some victims over others? Will racial disparities 
related to white victims of African-American defendants ever be removed 
from the process?301 Will we ever be able to explain to a sentencing jury 
how they should consider the victim impact information in relationship to the 
circumstances of the defendant or his crime? These and other questions may 
never be answered. In the interim, however, people are being sentenced to 
death in an atmosphere of confusion and uncertainty. 
If this country must continue its long-standing pursuit of the perfect 
death penalty, it should at least meet minimal standards of fundamental 
faimess.302 It makes no sense to go through the trouble of creating elaborate 
297. Associated Press, Pataki signs N.Y. death penalty into law with pens of slain 
officers, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 8,1995, at 16A. 
298. Id. 
299. Recent legislative activity that has led to several statutes and constitutional 
amendments to advance victim's rights suggests that political support is still formidable. 
300. See K. Elizabeth Whitehead, Note, Mourning Becomes Electric: Payne v. 
Tennessee's Allowance of Victim Impact Statements During Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 
45 ARK. L. REV. 531,552 (1992) (permitting victim impact statements reave courtrooms open 
to "theatrics" before the sentencing juries). 
301. See supra notes 244-52. 
302. "It is of vital importance ... that any decision to impose the death sentence be, 
and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion." Gardner v. Florida, 430 
U.S. 349,358 (1977). 
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capital punishment statutory schemes to protect the integrity of the process 
and then fail to provide adequate procedural safeguards for the most 
important and potentially volatile evidence that is likely to be presented in 
support of a convicted murderer's possible execution.303 
In the recent aftermath of the OJ. Simpson trial, it has also been 
demonstrated that the perceptions of the justice system among whites and 
blacks differs.304 Although this fact has been examined and discussed prior 
to the recent popular opinion polls that have accompanied the OJ. Simpson 
case,305 defense lawyers and capital defendants may now, more than ever, 
have to consider the possible risks of opting for a jury sentencing since racial 
and gender-based exclusion in jury selection has been legally prohibited.306 
With victim participation increasing, a capital defendant's well-informed 
election between a judge or a jury may be the only realistic protection that 
can be added to the capital punishment scheme in a country more willing 
than ever to exercise the public's desire for more executions.307 At a 
minimum, the addition of extensive pre-trial disclosure of victim impact 
information is consistent with a death penalty process that at least 
superficially attempts to respect both defendants and victims in the most 
serious decision that any criminal justice system can endorse. 
The specter of racism and the potential inflammatory emotional content 
of victim impact information requires that we treat victims and their 
testimony with great care. Victims demand participation, but the integrity of 
our judicial process requires that we do not totally lose control of the capital 
punishment process to the forces of emotion, retribution, or political whim. 
We must protect the valued option of jury sentencing for those capital 
defendants who may choose juries. We must also facilitate the legitimate 
concerns of a defendant to receive a fair sentencing trial and not permit the 
303. See Whitehead, supra note 300, at 548-49. 
304. See George Anastaplo, On Crime, Criminal Lawyers, and OJ. Simpson: Plato's 
Gorgias Revisited, 26 Loy. CHI. LJ. 455, 466 n .26 ( 1995) (citing the differences in racial 
attitudes between blacks and whites regarding Simpson's guilt reveal "the deep seated 
reservations that African-Americans have about the criminal justice system in the United 
States"). . 
305. In his classic work on the racial problem in America during 'the late 19th and 
early 20th century, Gunnar Myrdal noted that a legislative case can be made to establish that 
both crime statistics and results in criminal courts are affected by discrimination in the 
application of the criminal law. Thus, it is not surprising that attitudes toward the justice 
system are effected by pervasive discrimination. See GUNNAR MYRDAL ET AL., AN AMERICAN 
DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 966-76 (1962). 
306. See supra notes 274 and 275. 
307. See supra note 139. 
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victim to become the entire focus of a capital case. The goal should remain 
that a sentence of death should be based primarily on "the character of the 
individual and the circumstances of the crime."308 
Society may demand that the punishment fit the victim and the law may 
be moving toward accomplishing that result, but such a trend should not 
permit a trial by "victim impact surprise." At a minimum, a capital defendant 
should be given the raw materials necessary to make an informed decision 
about who will judge whether he should die at a time when the information 
will have some value to him. To do any less is inconsistent with the goal of 
maintaining a fair capital sentencing process. 
308. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983). 
